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Introduction

Understanding firms’ market entry decisions is a key element of economic policy
and regulation. Predicting whether there will be timely entry after a merger or
regulatory change requires a framework that determines the number and types of
competitors. More broadly, a model with endogenous entry, prices, product characteristics, and welfare outcomes can be used to evaluate policies prospectively.
When performing such analysis, researchers use the counterfactual equilibrium of
an estimated model to assess the impact of the policy under consideration. A
common challenge in this setting is the existence of multiple equilibria. Under
multiplicity, the model may not yield a unique prediction to the applied question,
difficulting policy analysis (Berry and Tamer, 2006; Borkovsky et al., 2015). Computing these multiple equilibria may also prove challenging when using numerical
methods, which may limit the researcher’s ability to gain a complete understanding
of the impacts of a policy of interest (Iskhakov et al., 2016).
We study equilibrium uniqueness in entry games with private information. Our
framework allows for rich forms of firm heterogeneity and selective entry. Our main
contribution is to provide a sufficient condition that guarantees equilibrium uniqueness. The condition is solely based on the model’s fundamentals and verifying it
does not require equilibrium computation. In many common applications, the sufficient condition can be checked by performing a simple calculation. For example,
in the influential articles of Roberts and Sweeting (2013) and Grieco (2014), the
authors use numerical methods to show that their fitted models have a unique
equilibrium. Using their estimates and our sufficient condition, we can confirm
equilibrium uniqueness in their fitted models, highlighting the usefulness of our results. Thus, our findings provide new tools for applied researchers studying entry.
We characterize firms’ equilibrium behavior using a simple index that we call
strength, which summarizes a firm’s ability to endure competition. The strength of
a firm is the unique symmetric threshold-strategy that makes the firm indifferent
to enter the market. A stronger firm is simultaneously more willing to enter the
market than a weaker competitor, despite facing more competition. The use of
strength in entry games is similar to the use of a Gittins index in multi-armed
bandit games (Gittins, 1979), as it aggregates the game’s relevant information,
facilitating the search for equilibria. For the class of models studied, we show that
there always exists an equilibrium in which the threshold strategies for entry are
ordered according to strength. We call this a herculean equilibrium. Thus, when
2

an entry game has a unique equilibrium, it must be herculean. Identifying the
herculean equilibrium, via the firms’ strength, is the starting point to develop our
sufficient condition for uniqueness. Among the advantages of using strength to
find equilibria is that it reduces the computing power necessary to estimate entry
models, as strength provides bounds for the herculean equilibrium strategies.
Our proposed framework embeds entry models commonly used in applied work.
It accommodates a large variety of post-entry models, including auctions and competitions in price or quantity. The framework also allows for rich forms of firm
heterogeneity. Firms are allowed to differ in their payoff functions or in their distribution of types, capturing that firms might be heterogeneous in their public
characteristics (e.g., firms might differ in their product characteristics, geographic
locations, or in their levels of vertical integration). Payoffs might depend on both
actions and the realized types of competitors, allowing a level of strategic interaction often ignored by the entry literature (auctions being an exception). For
example, if firms are privately informed about their marginal costs of production, facing a potential competitor with a lower marginal cost decreases a firm’s
expected profit. The magnitude of this decrease depends on the firms’ realized
marginal costs, their degree of product substitutability, and the number of entrants. We enrich the set of models available to applied researchers by including
these environments.
In the theoretical literature on market entry, Mankiw and Whinston (1986)
study welfare in a symmetric model under complete information. Closer to our
approach, Brock and Durlauf (2001) examine a symmetric environment in which
privately-informed agents choose a binary action. Our modeling shares the idea
that both the action and type of an agent affect the payoffs of other agents, but
differs in that entry decisions are strategic substitutes and in that we allow for
asymmetric agents. There is a large literature of costly entry into auctions. Levin
and Smith (1994) examine a symmetric scenario in which bidders learn their valuations after entry. Samuelson (1985) studies ex-ante symmetric bidders, which are
perfectly and privately informed about their valuations before entry. In Ye (2007),
bidders are partially informed at the moment of entry and fully learn their valuations after entry occurs. Our framework embeds these informational environments,
as a firm’s private information might correspond to its type or to a signal about
its type. We provide a general equilibrium characterization and an equilibrium
uniqueness result to a wider class of entry models.
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In the empirical literature, Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) and Berry (1992)
develop the first empirical models of market entry that explicitly accounted for
the strategic interaction between post-entry market competition and firms’ entry
decisions. Under complete information, the entry game often contains multiple
equilibria. Tamer (2003) show that, without further assumptions, multiple equilibria can lead to set, rather than point, identification.1 Using numerical methods,
Seim (2006) show that private information may solve the problem of equilibrium
multiplicity. Berry and Tamer (2006), however, construct examples of multiple
equilibria under private information, raising the question of when uniqueness can
be achieved. We contribute to this discussion by identifying a sufficient condition
guaranteeing equilibrium uniqueness in entry games with private information.
The importance of allowing for private information in entry models lies beyond
the possibility of solving the multiple equilibria problem. Using complementary
methodologies, Grieco (2014) and Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2021) test and reject
the hypothesis that firms possess complete information at the moment of entry.
Furthermore, compared to models that allow for private information, they show
that assuming complete information delivers model estimates that can lead to
qualitatively different predictions. Roberts and Sweeting (2013, 2016) provide
evidence of selection at the moment of entry, which cannot be accounted for by
complete information models. Finally, when firms receive signals about their true
type, we can observe behavior consistent with ex-post regret; i.e., entry into an
ex-ante profitable market but with negative observed outcomes. This type of
outcomes is incompatible with complete information models.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, discusses
its properties, and provides examples illustrating its scope. Section 3 introduces
and discusses the notions of firm strength and herculean equilibrium. Our main
results are presented in Section 4, which shows that the existence of a herculean
equilibrium is guaranteed and provides a sufficient condition for when the herculean
equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the game. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
All the proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
1

Sweeting (2009) shows that multiplicity can help with the model’s identification when the
values of staying ‘in’ or ‘out’ of the market are both endogenously determined. De Paula and
Tang (2012) show that multiplicity can be used to infer the signs of strategic interactions.
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2

A Model of Market Entry

2.1

The Baseline Model

Set up. Consider n firms simultaneously deciding on whether to enter a market. Firms are privately informed about their type vi (a scalar), summarizing
the firm’s information about its profitability upon entering the market.2 Firm i’s
post-entry profit depends on the entry decision of every firm, firm i’s type, and
the types of other entrants. The value vi distributes according to Fi ; a continuously differentiable atomless distribution, with full support on [a, b] where a, b ∈ R
(the extended reals). The draws of types are independent across firms but not
(necessarily) identically distributed.
Let ei ∈ {0, 1} be an indicator function taking the value 1 when firm i enters
the market, and 0 otherwise. Denote by e = (e1 , e2 , . . . , en ) the vector of expost entry decisions, we also refer to e as the (realized) market structure. Let
Ei = {e : ei = 1} be the set of market structures in which firm i enters. For a given
market structure e, define I(e) = {i : ei = 1} to be the set of firms participating
in market e. Similarly, define Ii (e) = {j 6= i : ej = 1} and Oi (e) = {j 6= i : ej = 0}
to be the set of i’s competitors that are in and out of the market under structure
e, respectively. Denote by v = (v1 , v2 , . . . , vn ) the vector with the realized types
of every firm. Similarly, v−i represents the realized types of every firm except
firm i and ve ≡ (vk )k∈I(e) the vector of realized types for every firm participating
in market structure e. Finally, for any market structure in which firm i enters
(e ∈ Ei ), e \ i denotes the market structure e without firm i in it. Similarly, for
a market structure in which firm j stays out (e 6∈ Ej ), e ∪ j denotes the market
structure e but with firm j participating in it.
With a slight abuse of notation, let πi (ve ) be a real valued function representing
firm i’s post-entry profit when the realized market structure is e and the realized
types are ve . By adopting this notation, we implicitly assume that the types of nonentrants are payoff irrelevant. To illustrate the workings of the notation observe
that πi (vi ) represents firm i’s post-entry profit when i is the sole entrant and draws
vi . Similarly, πi (v) = πi (vi , v−i ) represents i’s profit when every firm enters the
market and the vector of realized types is given by v. We normalize the payoff of a
non-entrant to zero. Finally, we assume that πi (ve ) is continuous, integrable (with
2

Although vi could also represent an informative signal about firm i’s true type, to ease
exposition we simply refer to it as type.
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finite expectation) in each dimension of ve , and differentiable in vi . We denote
such derivative by πi0 (ve ).
The timing of the game is as follows. Before making any entry decision, each
firm privately observes vi . After observing vi and without observing v−i , each
firm independently and simultaneously decides whether to enter the market. After
entry decisions are made, market structure e is realized and each firm entering the
market gets a payoff πi (ve ). The tuple (πi , Fi )ni=1 —which includes the number of
potential entrants n—is commonly known by every potential entrant.
Main assumptions. For a given market structure e in which firm i enters the
market (e ∈ Ei ), firm i’s profit function satisfies the following four properties.
A1 (Monotonicity): The profit function πi (ve ) is weakly increasing in vi and
strictly increasing if firm i is the sole entrant.
A1 gives economic meaning to the firms’ type. Upon entering the market, and
regardless of the realized market structure e, firm i’ profit increases in vi . In terms
of traditional competition models, a higher vi can represent a lower marginal cost
of production, a lower entry cost, a higher product quality, a better managerial
ability, or a higher valuation for a good in an auction.3
A2 (Competition): For each j ∈ Ii (e), πi (ve ) is weakly decreasing in vj . For
each j ∈ Oi (e), πi (ve ) ≥ πi (ve∪j ).
A2 concerns the impact of competition on profits. It states that competition
weakly decreases profits. In particular, πi (ve ) decreases with entry or when faced
with more productive (higher type) competitors.
A3 (Substitutes): For every firm j, there exists a market structure e in which
j does not participate (j ∈ Oi (e)) such that πi (ve ) > πi (ve∪j ) for vj ≥ v j .
A3 says that for every potential entrant, there exists a market structure for which
that entrant is a substitute. This is a minimal assumption about the degree of
substitutability among firms, as it does not require that every pair of firms to be
direct competitors. The impact that firm j has on i, for instance, can be through
affecting the equilibrium behavior of other firms participating under market structure e.4 Most models of competition, however, satisfy a stronger version of A3 in
3

The weakly increasing assumption accommodates environments with intense rivalry, such
as price competitions with homogeneous goods or second-price auctions, in which competition
might preclude higher types to increase ex-post payoffs.
4
Consider a Hotelling model in which firms 1 and 2 are located at each end of the street. If
transport costs are high, entry by 1 does not affect 2’s profit if they are the only entrants. Entry
by 1 can harm 2, however, if there is a third firm located in between 1 and 2.
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which entry by firm j has the potential to decrease firm i’s profit under any market
structure e.5
Before stating the next assumption, define φ(ve ) =

Q

j∈I(e)

fj (vj ) to be the joint

density of types of every firm participating in market structure e.
A4 (Costly and interior entry): There exist values v i < v i in the interior of
the support of Fi (vi )—i.e., v i , v i ∈ (a, b)—such that:
(i) πi (v i ) = 0 and,
(ii)
Z

πi (v i , v−i )φ(v−i )dn−1 v−i = 0,

[a,b]n−1

where the multiple integral is over each of the n − 1 dimensions of v−i .
A4 concerns the nature of the entry problem. Condition (i) simply states that
entry is costly. Firms need a sufficiently good type, v i > a, to be willing to enter
the market as the sole entrant. Jointly with assumption A2, A4 implies that,
when vi < v i , firm i would never choose to enter the market under any market
structure. That is, the value v i represents the minimal type required to enter
the market.6 Condition (ii) states that any firm will enter the market if its type
is sufficiently high. In particular, there exists a value v i < b such that drawing
vi > v i ensures entry, even if every potential competitor always enters the market.
The assumption that [v i , v i ] ⊂ (a, b) guarantees that every equilibrium is interior;
i.e., no firm optimally chooses either to never or to always enter the market.
Strategies and equilibrium. A cutoff strategy for firm i is a threshold xi
such that firm i enters the market whenever vi ≥ xi and stays out otherwise.
Let x = (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) be a vector of cutoff strategies. Firm i’s expected profit of
entering the market with type vi and facing opponents playing the cutoff strategies
x−i is



Z


b
X
Y


Πi (vi , x−i ) ≡
Fj (xj )
πi vi , ve\i φ(ve\i )dne −1 ve\i


(xj )j∈I (e)
e∈Ei

j∈Oi (e)

(1)

i

5

In our analysis, we can dispense of A3. If firm j is never a substitute of i, however, it does
not affect i’s equilibrium behavior and becomes irrelevant to determine whether i’s behavior is
consistent with a unique equilibrium. We adopt A3 for brevity in the proofs.
6
Notice that A4 is compatible with firms making non-negative variable profit upon entry. It
simply states that the entry cost is sufficiently high, so that the non-negative variable profit
cannot overcome the entry cost for low types.
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where ne =

P

j

ej is the number of entrants in market structure e.7 Firm i’s

expected profit from entry consists of the probability-weighted sum of i’s expected
payoffs in each market structure in which firm i participates, i.e., e ∈ Ei . The
payoffs in market structure e correspond to the expectation of πi (vi , ve\i ) over the
realizations of types of the competitors in e, ve\i . This expectation takes into
account that competitor j ∈ Ii (e) only enters the market if its valuation is above
its cutoff xj . Appendix B shows that (1) is strictly increasing in firm i’s type
vi . Firm i’s expected profit also increases in an opponent’s cutoff, xj ; a higher
entry cutoff lowers the competitor’s probability of entry, inducing firm i to face
less competition.
A Bayesian equilibrium is a vector of cutoff strategies x such that, for every
firm i, Πi (x) = 0; i.e., in equilibrium, when opponents play their equilibrium cutoff
strategy x−i , firm i is indifferent to enter the market when draws a type equal to
its equilibrium cutoff, xi . Online Appendix C shows that an equilibrium always
exists and that every equilibrium is in cutoff strategies; i.e., our focus on cutoff
strategies is without loss of generality. We denote the partial derivative of Πi (x)
with respect to xi by Π0i (x).

2.2

Selective Entry

Recent empirical work on market entry has shown the need to account for selection
in the entry process (c.f. Roberts and Sweeting, 2013). Selective entry occurs when
firms are partially informed about their type before making their entry decisions
and only become fully informed after costly entry has occurred.8 Our framework
accommodates selective entry models by adding a weak affiliation assumption between firms’ private information and their true type.
Let Fi (vi , θi ) be firm i’s joint cumulative distribution of signals vi and types θi
with support on [a, b] × [c, d] with c < d. The distributions Fi are independent
across firms and not necessarily identically distributed. Before making their costly
entry decisions, a firm privately observes its signal vi , which allows it to make
inferences about its true type, θi . Firms learn their type after entering the market.
Rd
Let Fi (vi ) = c Fi (vi , s)ds and let Fi (θi |vi ) = Fi (vi , θi )/Fi (vi ) be the CDF of θi
7

R
P
Q
The following (standard) notation is used throughout: ∅ k = 0, ∅ k = 1, and ∅ kdx = k.
8
Selective entry allows firms to have ex-post regret. For instance, complete and private information models cannot account for a market with a sole entrant (the most profitable outcome
under our assumptions) having negative post-entry profit. This outcome, however, is feasible
under selective entry.
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conditional on vi .
A5 (Affiliated Signals): For vi0 > vi , Fi (θi |vi0 ) < Fi (θi |vi ) for all θi .
A5 states that higher signals lead to a higher expected type in terms of first
order stochastic dominance (FOSD) (c.f. Marmer et al., 2013; Gentry and Li, 2014).
Let π̂i (θe ) be firm i’s profit under market structure e and the vector of types for
every participating firm is θe = (θj )j∈I(e) . Then, we re-interpret πi (ve ) as
Z

d

Y

π̂i (θe )

πi (ve ) =
c

fk (θk |vk )dne θe

k∈I(e)

where the integral is across the ne dimensions of θe . Given the properties of FOSD,
it is straightforward to see that if the profit function π̂i (θe ) satisfies analogous conditions to A1-A4, then πi (ve ) would also satisfy A1-A4, and the results presented
below go through.

2.3

Model Discussion

An important feature of the model is that it allows for general forms of publicly
observed ex-ante firm heterogeneity. Firms can differ in their distribution of types
Fi . The model also allows for firm heterogeneity in the profit function πi (ve ); i.e.,
even if firms face the same draws of types, profits might be different. Heterogeneity
in profits may come from firms having different entry costs, production costs,
production capacities, product characteristics, contracts with suppliers, or different
geographic locations. The heterogeneity in profitability may also be due to the way
firms compete after entry has occurred. Firm heterogeneity can accommodate the
existence of dominant firms or a predetermined order of play in the post-entry
market, such as, competition à la Stackelberg. The proposed framework can also
accommodate firms receiving aggregate or idiosyncratic random shocks after entry.
In such cases, πi (ve ) would correspond to the expected post-entry profit. Finally,
we highlight that the model can also accommodate entry into occupied markets.
That is, even though πi (vi ) denotes the profit of a single entrant, the market may
already have firms competing in it.
The proposed formulation of πi (ve ), however, does impose some restrictions
on the nature of post-entry competition. First, πi (ve ) is a function rather than a
correspondence, imposing that either the post-entry game has a unique equilibrium
or, under multiplicity of post-entry equilibria, there is market consensus about
9

which equilibrium will be played. Second, πi (ve ) does not depend on the profile of
cutoff strategies x. A natural interpretation for the model is that entering firms’
private information becomes public after entry occurs but before firms compete in
the product market. Consequently, firms carry no beliefs about their competitors’
private information to the post-entry game. Finally, our setting is consistent with
cases where the type is irrelevant for post-entry strategies (e.g., firms are privately
informed about their entry costs) or that no information is revealed after entry;
πi (ve ) is only observed at the end of the game.
To see why the omission of x in πi (ve ) is restrictive, consider the case in which ve
remains private in the post-entry game but the market structure e is observed. In
such scenario, firms may base their strategies in the post-entry game on their beliefs
about the private information of their competitors. Through Bayesian updating,
these beliefs would depend on the strategy profile x and the observed market
structure e, making it part of the post-entry profit function. Although important,
the analysis of such models lies outside of the scope of this article.

2.4

Examples

We present several examples used in applied work that satisfy our assumptions to
illustrate the relevance of our results.
Example 1 (Linear model). We say that the profit function is linear when πi (ve ) =
πi (e) + vi , where πi (e) is firm i’s profit under market structure e, which does not
depend on the realization of ve . In this scenario, the type of a competitor j does not
directly affect firm i’s payoff. Firm j’s type does, however, affect firm i indirectly
through j’s entry decision. The most common interpretation of the linear model
is that −vi represents firm i’s entry cost. Below we discuss three variations used
in the empirical literature:9
(a) Heterogeneous competition: In studying entry into the video retail industry, Seim (2006) used a linear model of the form
X

πi (ve ) = ηi +

δij + vi

j∈Ii (e)
9

In addition to the articles mentioned in the examples, other work involving linear entry
models with private information include: Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007); Bajari et al. (2007);
Pakes et al. (2007); Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008); Sweeting (2009); Aradillas-Lopez
(2010); Bajari et al. (2010); De Paula and Tang (2012); Vitorino (2012); Mazzeo et al. (2016).
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where ηi is a scalar summarizing both market and firm characteristics.10 The
term δij > 0 captures how entry by firm j affects i’s profit. This model captures
different degrees of substitution among firms, as entry by different competitors
may have a different impact on firm i’s profit. This differential effect, however, is
independent of the number of competitors entering the market.
(b) Decreasing marginal impact of competition: In studying entry into airlines routes, Berry (1992) studies a complete information version of the following
entry model11
πi (ve ) = ηi − δi

nX
e −1

rik−1 + vi

k=1

where ne is the number of entrants in market structure e. In this model, the
impact that entry has on i’s profit is independent of the entrant’s identity. The
model, however, captures that the marginal impact of entry is decreasing in the
number of competitors. Entry by a new competitor decreases profits at a fraction
ri ∈ [0, 1] of the previous entrant. In Example (a), as the number of entrants
increases, profits diverge to −∞. In this model, on the other hand, the effect of
competition is bounded by ηi − δi /(1 − ri ) + vi .
(c) Auctions with private entry cost: Consider an auction environment in
which each bidder is privately informed about its entry cost and only learns its
valuation (and potentially the identity of participating competitors) after paying
the entry cost (c.f. Krasnokutskaya and Seim, 2011, for the case of a first-price
auction). This environment is captured by πi (ve ) = πi (e) + vi where πi (e) represents firm i’s expected profit of participating in an auction under realized market
structure e. Because entry costs are independent of valuations, entry strategies
do not affect the bidding behavior in market structure e.
Observe that, in a scenario with n = 2 potential competitors, as in Grieco (2014),
the three models above can be represented by πi (ve ) = ηi − Ij∈I(e) δi + vi , where
Ij∈I(e) is an indicator reflecting entry by the competitor.
Example 2 (Auctions with selective entry). Consider a second-price auction where
bidders are partially (and privately) informed about their own valuation before
making entry decisions. The valuation of bidder i is given by θi = vi εi , where
10

Observe that, although the term ηi is commonly known by the firms’, an econometrician
may not observe some elements in ηi . Typically, ηi = Xi βi + ζi where Xi is a vector of observed
firm and market characteristics and ζi is heterogeneity unobserved by the econometrician.
11
Berry (1992) instead uses a logarithmic version of the model: πi (ve ) = ηi − δi ln(ne − 1) + vi .
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the signal vi is observed before the participation decision is made and the noise
εi ∼ Gi , which is independent from vi , is observed after paying the participation
cost Ki > 0 but before submitting a bid.12
For a given realization of signals and market structure ve , define Φ(s, ve ) =
Q

j∈I(e)

Gj (s/vj ) to be the probability that every firm participating in market struc-

ture e obtains a valuation less than s. Then, if r ≥ 0 is the reserve price of the
auction, the (expected) payoff of a firm that participates under ve is:
Z

b

Z

vi εi

(vi εi − max{r, s})dΦ s, ve\i

πi (ve ) =
r/vi




dGi (εi ) − Ki .

−∞

A participating firm i pays the entry cost Ki and, given the signal vi , bidder i
values the good by θi = vi εi , which distributes according to Gi (ε). Participating
firms submit a bid equal to their valuation only if they value the good more than
the reserve price r. Bidder i obtains the good when it is the highest valuation
firm. The distribution of the highest valuation among i’s opponents is Φ(s, ve ). It
can be readily checked that this model satisfies assumptions A1-A5. Variations of
this model have been studied by Roberts and Sweeting (2013, 2016), Gentry and
Li (2014), and Sweeting and Bhattacharya (2015).
Example 3 (Oligopolistic competition). Our framework also accommodates traditional forms of oligopolistic competition. For instance, entry into a market in
which firms compete in prices under differentiated products can be modeled with
a logit demand, such as
πi (ve ) = (pi − ci )Si (ve )M − Ki ,

where Si (ve ) =

Di D λ
D (1 + Dλ )

is firm i’s market share, which is determined by Di = exp((ηi + vi − αpi )/λ) and
P
D = j∈I(e) Dj . The model is described by the market size M as well as firm
i’s entry costs Ki , marginal cost ci and product/market characteristics, ηi . The
parameter α captures consumers’ tastes and λ ∈ [0, 1] captures the strength of
the consumers’ outside option. Every potential entrant commonly knows all these
parameters. The vector of equilibrium prices, pe = (pj )j∈I(e) , and market shares are
a function of the realized market structure e and the draws of types of the entrants,
12

If we further assume that E(εi ) = 1, the signal vi becomes an unbiased predictor of the
valuation
θi . That is, for a given realization of vi , the expected valuation is given by E(θi |vi ) =
R∞
vi −∞ εi dGi (εi ) = vi .

12

ve . In this scenario, vi represents a product characteristic (such as quality) that
is privately known before entry decisions are made, but becomes publicly known
after entry occurs. This model satisfies assumptions A1-A4. Complete information
versions of this model (i.e., not incorporating the vi term) have been studied by
Ciliberto et al. (2020) in the context of entry and by Bresnahan (1987), Berry
(1994), and Berry et al. (1995) when the number of competitors is exogenous.
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Strength and Herculean Equilibrium

This section introduces two key concepts: firm strength and herculean equilibrium. Strength uses the game fundamentals—(Fi , πi )nj=1 —to rank firms according
to their ability to endure competition. We use strength to identify the equilibrium
that remains when the game has a unique equilibrium: the herculean equilibrium.
Identifying the herculean equilibrium is the starting point to develop our sufficient
condition for equilibrium uniqueness.
Definition (Strength). Let σi (v) ≡ Πi (v, . . . , v), where Πi (x) is given by (1). The
strength of firm i is the unique number si ∈ R that solves σi (si ) = 0; i.e.,



Z


b
X
Y


σi (si ) =
Fj (si )
πi si , ve\i φ(ve\i )dne −1 ve\i = 0.


(si )j∈I (e)
e∈Ei

j∈Oi (e)

(2)

i

We say that firm i is stronger than firm j if si < sj .
Lemma 1. σi (s) is strictly increasing and crosses zero once.
The strength of firm i is the unique cutoff si that is a best response to every
other competitor playing the same cutoff strategy si . Intuitively, strength ranks
firms according to their ability to endure competition. A lower cutoff strategy for
firm i implies that the firm is more likely to enter the market, as it enters for lower
types. Similarly, a lower cutoff strategy by competitors implies that firm i is more
likely to face competition. Firm i being stronger than firm j (si < sj ) indicates
that firm i, despite facing more competition than j, is more likely than j to enter
the market. Lemma 1 shows that strength is well defined, as it assigns a unique
scalar si to each firm i and, therefore, delivers a complete ranking of the firms.
Strength motivates our next definition.
Definition (Herculean Equilibrium). An equilibrium is called herculean if equilibrium cutoffs are ordered by strength, with stronger firms playing lower cutoffs.
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Intuitively, because stronger firms are more able to endure competition, they
should be more inclined to enter the market than weaker firms. Therefore, an
equilibrium in which cutoffs are ordered by strength should naturally emerge in
entry games. Figure 1 illustrates this intuition graphically in an environment with
two asymmetric entrants. The functions σ1 (s) and σ2 (s) define the strength of
each firm. By Lemma 1, the functions σi (s) are strictly increasing, crossing the
horizontal axis once, at s1 and s2 , respectively. In this scenario, firm 1 is stronger
than firm 2, as s1 < s2 .
[Figure 1 around here]
We use strength to construct a herculean equilibrium in this asymmetric scenario. Let bi (x) be firm’s i best response to a cutoff x. Because expected profits are
increasing in the firm’s type, firm i’s best response decreases in x; i.e., when faced
with less competition (higher x), firm i is willing to enter at a lower type. Assume
that firm 2 plays the cutoff s2 . Because best responses are decreasing, we have
b1 (s2 ) < b1 (s1 ) = s1 (see Figure 1), where the equality follows from the definition
of strength. In turn, if firm 1 plays b1 (s2 ) < s2 , we have b2 (b1 (s2 )) > b2 (s2 ) = s2 ,
where strength was again used in the equality. Consequently, we have shown that
b1 (s2 ) < s1 < s2 < b2 (b1 (s2 )). Continuing with these iterated best responses,
we can construct monotonic sequences. By assumption A4, these sequences are
bounded, converging to an equilibrium x1 < x2 in which cutoffs are ordered by
strength—an herculean equilibrium. The previous argument does not preclude
the existence of multiple herculean or non-herculean equilibria. The next section
shows the existence of herculean equilibria more broadly and provides a sufficient
condition guaranteeing equilibrium uniqueness.

4

Existence and Uniqueness

In this section, we show the existence of a herculean equilibrium in three settings that are commonly used in applied work. As a consequence of this result,
if the entry game has a unique equilibrium, it must be herculean. We establish a
sufficient condition guaranteeing equilibrium uniqueness and provide examples illustrating how the proposed condition can be used in practice. The next definition
is instrumental for the sufficient condition.
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Definition (Expected profit loss). For any vector of cutoff strategies x define the
expected profit loss that entry by firm j inflicts on firm i to be



Z


∞
X
Y

∆i,j (x) =
Fk (xk )
δi,j (xi , xj , ve\i )φ(ve\i )dne −1 ve\i > 0 (3)


(xk )k∈I (e)
e∈Ei \Ej

k∈Oi (e)

i

where δi,j (xi , xj , ve\i ) = πi (xi , ve\i ) − πi (xi , xj , ve\i ) is firm i’s profit loss inflicted by
firm j entry in market structure e when the realized types of the other entrants is
ve\i . By assumption A2, we know that δi,j (xi , xj , ve\i ) ≥ 0.
The expected profit loss captures the decrease in profit that firm i experiences
when firm j marginally decreases its entry cutoff xj and firm i draws type xi .13
A small change in xj only affects firm i’s expected profit at firm j’s pivotal draw,
vj = xj . At that draw, firm j’s entry occurs, inducing firm i to lose ∆i,j (x).
The expected profit loss will help us characterize how firm j’s best response to
firm i’s behavior affects firm i’s profitability. As we shall see below, if firm j’s
best response has a bounded effect in firm i’s profitability (and reciprocally), the
entry game has a unique equilibrium. Although assumption A2 only implies that
δi,j (xi , xj , ve\i ) ≥ 0, together with assumption A3 we have that ∆i,j (x) > 0.

4.1

Ex-ante Symmetric Games

We now study existence and uniqueness of herculean equilibrium in the context
of ex-ante symmetric firms; i.e., firms that have the same ex-ante characteristics
but different ex-post outcomes due to particular realizations of the firms’ type.
Symmetric entry games have been studied, for example, by Bresnahan and Reiss
(1990, 1991), in the context of complete information, and by Brock and Durlauf
(2001), Sweeting (2009), and Grieco (2014) in the context of private information.
We say that firm i’s profit function is anonymous if, for every market structure
e ∈ Ei , firm i’s profit function does not depend on the identities of the entrants;
i.e., πi (ve ) = πi (vi , vne −1 ) where vr is an r-dimensional vector of realized types and
ne is the number of entrants in e. An entry game is called symmetric when every
firm has the same distribution of types, Fi (vi ) = F (vi ), and profit functions are
anonymous and symmetric, πi (ve ) = π(vi , vne −1 ).
Proposition 1. In symmetric entry games, there exists a unique herculean equilibrium, where a firm’s cutoff is given by its strength. That is, xi = s for every
13

Observe that ∆i,j (x) does not integrate over the i and j dimensions.
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firm i, where s is the unique number that solves


Z b
n−1 
X
n−1
r
n−1−r
π(s, vr )φ(vr )d vr = 0.
σ(s) =
F (s)
r
s
r=0
Moreover, the herculean (i.e., symmetric) equilibrium is the only equilibrium of the
game if the condition
f (xi ) ∆i,j (x)
< 1,
F (xi ) Π0i (x)

(4)

holds for any pair of firms i and j, and for every vector x such that each dimension
satisfies xk ∈ [v, v].
In symmetric entry games, there always exists a unique herculean equilibrium,
as, under symmetry, the herculean cutoffs coincide with the firms’ strength and,
by Lemma 1, strength is uniquely defined. Proposition 1’s main contribution is
to provide a sufficient condition under which no asymmetric equilibria exists. The
sufficient condition (4) is a stability condition. It guarantees that the gain in firm
i’s expected profit induced by an increase in its own cutoff xi cannot be overcome
by any best response by its competitors’.
To illustrate the main steps of the proof, consider the case with two symmetric
firms. Let b2 (x1 ) be firm 2’s unique best response to x1 , b2 (x1 ) is decreasing
in x1 . Observe that every equilibrium of the game satisfies Π1 (x1 , b2 (x1 )) = 0.
Consequently, if Π1 (x1 , b2 (x1 )) is strictly increasing in x1 , the function crosses
zero once and a unique equilibrium exists. Let x = (x1 , b2 (x1 )), differentiating
Π1 (x1 , b2 (x1 )) with respect to x1 we obtain
f (x1 )
∂Π1 (x)
dΠ1 (x)
= Π01 (x) + b02 (x1 )
> Π01 (x) −
∆1,2 (x) > 0.
dx1
∂x2
F (x1 )
The first step of the uniqueness proof consists of providing a bound to the interaction between the slope of firm 2’s best response and its impact on firm 1’s profit.
Sufficient condition (4) plays an important role in establishing this bound, as is
used to establish the first inequality. The second inequality follows from condition
(4) as well.
Computing the equilibrium is not necessary to check whether condition (4)
holds, as it only makes use of the information given in the fundamentals of the
game. As shown below, depending on the application, condition (4) might require
only a simple calculation. Because of symmetry, the condition only needs to hold
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for any pair of potential firms. It is sufficient to check it where entry is feasible—
i.e., xk ∈ [v, v]—as deviations outside this range are always outside the equilibrium
path.
The next set of examples illustrate how sufficient condition (4) works in practice. We discuss some of its properties and how it changes with competition.
Moreover, we use it to show that the empirical model in Grieco (2014) has a
unique equilibrium.
Example 4 (Symmetric linear model). Consider the linear model of Example 1(b)
in a symmetric environment. In this scenario, the post-entry profit of a given firm
i becomes
πi (ve ) = η − δ

nX
e −1

rk−1 + vi .

k=1

Under symmetry, the model embeds Example 1(a) when r = 1. Sufficient condition
(4) holds if, for xi ∈ [v, v], the following inequality is satisfied (see Online Appendix
D for a step-by-step derivation)
1
f (xi )
<
,
F (xi )
δF (v) (r + F (v) (1 − r))n−2

(5)

where v = −η and v = δ(1 − rn−1 )/(1 − r) − η. That is, the reversed hazard rate of
F needs be bounded above by the inverse of δF (v) (r + F (v)(1 − r))n−2 . We use
condition (5) to illustrate relevant properties:
(a) Log-concave distributions. When F is log-concave, its reversed hazard
rate f (xi )/F (xi ) is decreasing in xi .14 Consequently, the sufficient condition (5)
−1
reduces to f (v)/F (v) < δF (v) (r + F (v)(1 − r))n−2
. For instance, if types
distribute type-I extreme value (as in Seim, 2006)15 and r = 1, it can be readily
checked that the sufficient condition for uniqueness becomes η + ln(δ) < exp(η −
(n − 1)δ); a restriction to the parameters of the model. Figure 2a illustrates this
restriction for different number of potential entrants. The area outside the curves
represents the combination of parameters delivering a unique equilibrium. Inside
the curves, the game might have a unique or multiple equilibria.
If G(x) = ln(F (x)) is concave, then G00 (x) = d(f (x)/F (x))/dx < 0. Examples of log-concave
distributions include normal, exponential, extreme value, logistic, and gamma.
15
A type-I extreme value distribution with location parameter 0 and scale parameter λ is
given by F (v) = exp(− exp(−v/λ)). Then, its inverted hazard rate is given by f (v)/F (v) =
exp(−v/λ)/λ, which is decreasing in v. This distribution is called standard when λ = 1.
14
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[Figure 2 around here]

(b) Uniqueness and competition. Continuing with the previous example, we
now explore the effect of competition on sufficient condition (5). In the linear
model, competition manifests through two channels: the number of potential
competitors, n, and the decreasing marginal impact of entry, r. For the latter,
observe that an increase in r decreases the right hand side of (5)—making the
condition harder to satisfy—directly through r (entry has more impact) and indirectly by increasing v (enlarging the set of possible deviations). Consistent with
the traditional logic of entry games, the prospects of facing multiple equilibria
increase with the gains from coordinating entry; i.e., when the profit losses from
competition become large. As a consequence, when comparing both panels of
Figure 2, we can see that an increase in the marginal impact of entry, r, shrinks
the set of parameters that deliver a unique equilibrium.
Increasing the number of competitors, n, also increases the set of possible deviations v. In contrast, a larger n has the countervailing effect of increasing the
expected number of entrants, captured by (r+F (v)(1−r))n−2 . When the marginal
effect of entry is decreasing (i.e., when r < 1), a larger number of entrants decreases the expected profit loss (3) that firm j inflicts on firm i. This makes firm
i less susceptible to entry, increasing the set of parameters for which uniqueness
occurs. The interaction between these effects makes the set of parameters satisfying (5) to change non-monotonically with n (see Figure 2b). This stands in
contrast to the scenario with a constant marginal effect of entry (r = 1). There,
only the effect of increasing v remains, making the set of parameters satisfying
(5) shrink with the number of potential entrants n (see Figure 2a). In the limit,
as n becomes unboundedly large, the restriction for r = 1 becomes the tightest
and equal to η + ln(δ) < 0. In contrasts, when r < 1, the model always has a
unique equilibrium, as the right hand side of (5) goes to infinity.
(c) Equlibrium multiplicity and uniqueness under Normality. Suppose
types distribute N (0, σ), which is log-concave. Berry and Tamer (2006) observe
that, in a game with two entrants (n = 2) and under the assumption δ > η, the
entry game has multiple equilibria when it converges to a complete information
game (σ → 0) and has a unique equilibrium when the private information dominates (σ → ∞). We can use sufficient condition (5), δF (v)f (v)/F (v) < 1, to
provide a tighter characterization. Suppose, for instance, that η = 0 and δ = 1
18

√
(so that, v = 0 and v = 1). Then, because both f (0)/F (0) = 2/ 2πσ 2 and F (v)
are decreasing in σ, there is a threshold σ̂ = 0.7298 such that σ > σ̂ guarantees
equilibrium uniqueness.
For example, if σ = 1/4 the game has three equilibria. The herculean equilibrium,
which is symmetric and given by the cutoff strategy xi = 0.2055, and two asymmetric equilibria, given by xi = 0.041 and x3−i = 0.435, for i ∈ {1, 2}. Similarly,
if σ = 1, the game has a unique equilibrium given by xi = 0.3596.
(d) A concrete application. When studying entry of supercenters into rural
grocery markets, Grieco (2014) estimates a symmetric incomplete information
model under the assumption that vi ∼ N (0, 1) and two potential entrants (n = 2).
In the smallest market, where coordination among entrants is more relevant, the
model estimates are given by η = −3.838 and δ = 0.851.16 Using the log-concavity
property of the normal distribution, in conjunction with the model estimates,
sufficient condition (5) becomes δF (v) f (v)/F (v) = 10−4 < 1. We can conclude
that the equilibrium is unique.

4.2

Two Groups of Firms

We now extend our results to games in which entrants can be divided into two
groups according to their public characteristics. Within each group, firms are exante symmetric. Across groups, however, firms can differ in their distribution of
types and profit functions. In applied work, models of two groups of entrants
have been used, for example, to study the timberwood industry (mills and loggers) by Athey et al. (2011) and Roberts and Sweeting (2013, 2016) as well as
to study in highway procurement auctions (favored and non-favored bidders) by
Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011). The two-group structure may arise naturally in
applications where firms can be divided in incumbents and entrants, high and low
quality firms, local and international producers, discount and traditional retailers,
or legacy and low-cost airlines, among other examples.
Formally, let Gg be the set of firms belonging to group g ∈ {1, 2}. Group g
consists of ng ∈ N potential entrants (so that, n1 + n2 = n) described by the pair
(πg , Fg ). Let g(i) be the group of firm i. We assume that profits are symmetric and
anonymous within a group. That is, firm i’s profit under market structure e is now
16

See Table 7, page 329: η = µ0 − µ4 = −1.222 − 2.158 = −3.838. Condition (4) also holds for
every other specification in the paper.
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equal to πi (ve ) = πg(i) (vi , vr , vk ) where r and k are the number of entrants, other
than i, from group g(i) and −g(i), respectively. The vectors vr and vk represent
the draws of valuations of such entrants.
Because firms are within-group symmetric, firms in the same group have equal
strength. A herculean equilibrium, thus, consists of group-symmetric strategies in
which the strongest group plays the lowest cutoff. To formally characterize a groupQ
symmetric equilibrium, define ϕg (vr ) = rj=1 fg (vj ) to be the probability density
that r firms belonging to group g draw the vector vr . For a pair of cutoffs x̂ =
(x1 , x2 ) describing group-symmetric strategies by the opponents, firm i’s expected
profit of entering the market with a draw of vi , when there are r and k entrants,
other than firm i, from group g(i) and −g(i), is given by
Z b Z

b

E[πi (vi , r, k)|x̂] =
x1

k



πg(i) (vi , vr , vk )ϕ−g(i) (vk )d vk ϕg(i) (vr )dr vr

x2

where the integrals are over the r and k dimensions of vr and vk . Then, when
faced with group-symmetric strategies x̂ (i.e., xj = xg(j) for every firm j 6= i), firm
i’s expected profit of entering the market under valuation vi is
( 
"n −1 
#)

nj
i
X
X
nj
ni − 1
nj −k
ni −1−r
Πi (vi , x−i ) =
Fj (xj )
Fi (xi )
E[πi (vi , r, k)|x̂]
,
k
r
r=0
k=0
where for ease in notation, we use i and j instead of g(i) and −g(i) as it leads to
no confusion. The previous expression corresponds to equation (1) in the context
of two groups of firms playing group-symmetric strategies. To understand the
previous expression, fix a market structure in which r and k firms of group i and
j participate in the market. Because there are nj firms in group j, there are ‘nj
choose k’ possibilities to obtain a market structure with k competitors from group
j. Each of these possibilities occur with probability Fj (xj )nj −k ; i.e., the probability
that nj − k firms obtain a low draw and stay out of the market. Similarly, there
are ‘ni − 1 choose r’ possibilities to observe r competitors from i’s group, each
occurring with probability Fi (xi )ni −1−k . The expression above is, thus, obtained
by summing across every possible market structure.
A pair of strategies x̂ constitutes a group-symmetric equilibrium if and only if,
for each firm i, xi = xg(i) and the vector of strategies x satisfies Πi (x) = 0. Without
loss of generality, let group 1 be the strongest group. The following theorem is the
main result of this subsection.
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Theorem 1. A herculean equilibrium always exists. The herculean equilibrium x
satisfies x1 < s1 < s2 < x2 , where sg and xg are the strength and the equilibrium
cutoff of group g. Moreover, the herculean equilibrium is the unique equilibrium
of the game if these four conditions
fi (xi ) ∆i,j (x)
<1
Fi (xi ) Π0i (x)
fi (xi ) ∆i,j (x)
ng(j)
<1
Fi (xi ) Π0i (x)

if j ∈ Gg(i) ,

(6)

if j ∈ G−g(i) ,

(7)

hold for any pair of firms i and j, and for every vector x such that each dimension
satisfies xk ∈ [v g(k) , v g(k) ].
Theorem 1 has two main results. First, as a herculean equilibrium always
exists, the theorem shows that strength is the right notion to characterize the
firms’ relative competitiveness. In many empirical applications, where multiplicity
of equilibria is a concern, the model estimation is based on assuming that firms play
an equilibrium that is ex-ante ‘intuitive’ given the fundamentals of the model (c.f.
Roberts and Sweeting, 2013). As we show in Example 5 below, although intuitive
orders are consistent with the proposed notion of strength, they are restrictive in
that many applications might not have an ex-ante ‘intuitive’ order. Strength, in
turn, provides an order in any entry game. Theorem 1 also provides bounds on
the herculean equilibrium cutoffs—x1 ∈ (v 1 , s1 ) and x2 ∈ (s2 , v 2 )—which speeds
up numerical computation of herculean equilibria.
Second, Theorem 1 provides four conditions that need to be satisfied for equilibrium uniqueness—two conditions per group. The within-group condition (6)
is analogous to the sufficient condition for uniqueness in symmetric entry games
(4).17 This condition bounds the change in profit due to deviations from firms
within the same group; i.e., it guarantees that no profitable deviation from a groupsymmetric strategy exists. Empirical applications usually restrict their analysis to
group-symmetric strategies. Condition (6), thus, guarantees that this restriction
is without loss. If an applied researcher determines that within-group asymmetric strategies are not relevant for the application at hand, this condition can be
dispensed.
The cross-group condition (7), on the other hand, guarantees that the herculean
17

Proposition 1 is a particular case of Theorem 1 when one of the groups has no members.
We chose to split the results for clarity in the exposition and because the symmetric model has
value on its own.
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equilibrium is the unique group-symmetric equilibrium of the game. This condition
bounds the change in profit due to a group-symmetric deviation from the opposing
group. Observe that the left hand side of condition (7) is multiplied by the number
of firms in group j. In group-symmetric strategies, there are ng(j) firms deviating
simultaneously; thus, the condition needs to bound ng(j) deviations at the same
time. Comparing conditions (6) and (7), we can see that the former condition does
not directly depend on ng(j) (because j ∈ Gg(i) , ng(j) is the number of competitors
in the same group as firm i). This is so, because we can exploit the within-group
symmetry among firms to obtain a ‘tighter’ bound. Below we show that condition
(7) might not necessarily be more restrictive than condition (6).
Example 5 (Linear model). Consider the linear model of Example 4(b). In particular, assume that the marginal impact of competition is constant, r = 1, and
that firm i’s type distributes type-I extreme value with scale parameter λi . Firm
i’s profit is given by
πi (ve ) = ηi − (ne − 1)δi + vi
where δi > 0. In this context, the group g’s strength is obtained by picking any
firm i ∈ Gg and solving (2)
si = δi

X

(1 − Fk (si )) − ηi .

k6=i

Group g’s strength negatively depends on the expected number of entrants when
P
every firm plays the cutoff strategy si , k6=i (1 − Fk (si )), weighted by the impact
that each entrant has on profits, δi . Strength positively depends on the public
characteristics of the firm. Because the relation between ηi and δi was studied in
Example 4, we simplify the analysis below by assuming ηi = 0 for both groups.
Consequently, the relevant range for i’s cutoffs is given by v i = 0 and v i = (n−1)δi .
Let δ̂i = δi /λi . Using the log-concave property of extreme value distributions,
conditions for uniqueness (6) and (7) become (see Online Appendix D for details)

Ci,j




 
exp −(n − 1)δ̂i > ln δ̂i
if j ∈ Gg(i)




=
.
exp −(n − 1)δ̂ > ln n δ̂
if
j
∈
G
j
j i
−g(i)

(8)

As discussed in Example 4(b), an increase in the total number of potential entrants
(from either group) make both constrains more strict when r = 1. Finally, observe
that the Ci,i constraint simplifies to a threshold value for δ̂i .
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We use this example to illustrate how the notion of strength helps discerning
the (herculean) cutoff order before computing equilibrium. Then, we show how
the sufficient conditions for uniqueness restrict the set of parameters under various
number of potential entrants. Finally, we use our sufficient conditions to show that
Roberts and Sweeting (2013, 2016) have a unique equilibrium.
(a) Strength. Suppose that δ1 < δ2 and λ2 > λ1 . In this scenario, a firm in
group 1 is less affected by competition than a firm in group 2. In addition, the
types of a firm in group 1 stochastically dominate those of a firm of group 2 (in
the relevant range for entry, vi ≥ v = 0). In this scenario, it is ‘intuitive’ to think
that group 1 is more competitive than group 2, thus we expect group 1 to enter
more often; i.e., to play a lower entry cutoff.
If, in turn, we have that δ1 < δ2 and λ2 < λ1 , we cannot use an intuitive criterion
because each parameter drives competitiveness in a different direction. Although
group 1 is less affected by competition compared to group 2 (δ1 < δ2 ), group 2 is
more likely to draw higher types (λ1 > λ2 ). We can use our notion of strength to
discern ex-ante the cutoff order in a herculean equilibrium. This is useful because
a herculean equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, regardless of whether the game
has a unique or multiple equilibria.
[Figure 3 around here]
To illustrate the previous point, consider the case with two asymmetric firms (i.e.,
n1 = n2 = 1) characterized by δ1 = 1 and δ2 = λ2 = 5/4. The intuitive criterion
allows to rank firms, and discern a suitable equilibrium, only when λ1 ≥ λ2 .
Figure 3 depicts the firms’ strength as a function of λ1 . The strength of firm 1 is
a constant (s1 = 0.4909), as it does not depend on λ1 . Firm 2 becomes weaker
(s2 increases) when firm 1 becomes more competitive by drawing higher types.
Consistent with the ‘intuitive’ criterion, firm 1 is stronger when λ1 > λ2 ; firm 1
is simultaneously less sensitive to entry and draws higher types. As λ1 decreases,
firm 1 remains stronger until it reaches λs ≡ 0.7058, the value of λ1 which makes
both firms equally strong. When λ1 < λs , firm 2 becomes the stronger firm in
the game. Figure 3 also shows the herculean equilibrium for each value of λ1 .
Consistent with the previous analysis, firm 1 plays the lowest cutoff whenever it
is the stronger firm in the game. In summary, for values of λ1 > λs , firm 1 plays
a lower cutoff, despite λ1 < λ2
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(b) Uniqueness with two asymmetric firms. Continuing with the previous
example of an entry game with two asymmetric firms (n1 = n2 = 1), Figure
4a depicts the set of parameters that satisfy restrictions C1,2 and C2,1 . Aligned
with the intuition that equilibrium multiplicity tends to occur when coordination
among firms is important—that is, when the market is likely to support only
one firm in equilibrium—multiplicity arises when the profit loss from entry by a
competitor, δi , is high; or when a firm is unlikely to obtain a high type (low λi ).

[Figure 4 around here]

(c) Uniqueness with three asymmetric firms. To see how the sufficient
condition changes when we increase the number of potential entrants, suppose
instead that we have three firms: two belonging to group 1 and one belonging
to group 2. In this scenario, conditions for uniqueness (6) and (7) become three
restrictions on the model parameters. These restrictions are shown in Figure 4b.
The restriction C1,1 , that entry by a firm in group 1 imposes in the other group
1 firm, becomes δ̂1 < 1.1138. As can be observed, in this example, the restriction
C1,2 is actually redundant. To have a unique equilibrium, a firm in group 1 is
more constrained by the behavior of firms in its own group, than the behavior
of the firm in the other group. The restriction that group 1 imposes in group 2,
C2,1 , also tightens, as the curve shifts downwards. As mentioned above, because
this example assumes a constant marginal impact of competition (r = 1), the set
of parameters delivering uniqueness shrinks with the number of competitors. If
r < 1, on the other hand, the set may either shrink or expand.
Example 6 (Uniqueness in a second-price auction with selective entry.). Using a
second-price auction model with selective-entry, Roberts and Sweeting (2013, 2016)
study the USFS timber auctions. The auction consists of two groups of potential
entrants, millers and loggers (groups 1 and 2, respectively). Before entry, each firm
observes a signal vi = θi εi , where θi is firm i’s valuation for a tract and εi represents
the signal’s noise. For the representative (mean) auction they estimate ln θi ∼
N (µg(i) , 0.3321) (with µ1 = 3.9607 and µ2 = 3.5824) and ln εi ∼ N (0, 0.8579). The
estimated entry costs is $2.0543/mfb (dollars per thousand board foot) and the
auction’s reserve price is $27.77/mfb.18 Searching numerically, they found a single
18

See Tables 3 or 4 in Roberts and Sweeting (2013, 2016), respectively.
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equilibrium. We prove, for the representative auction, that the game has indeed a
unique equilibrium. In the scenario, with two asymmetric entrants n1 = n2 = 1, we
find that the left hand side of condition (7) for millers and loggers are 0.2104 and
0.0017 (both less than one); as a consequence, the game has a unique equilibrium.
Online Appendix E offers details on the computations, as well of a discussion of
strength and herculean equilibrium for this auction.

4.3

Quasi-symmetric games

In an entry game, there are two elements that determine payoffs: the distribution
of types Fi (vi ) and the profit function πi (ve ). A game is called quasi-symmetric
when firms differ only in one of these two elements. In this section we extend
our results to quasi-symmetric environments in which the n potential entrants
might be ex-ante asymmetric. Formally, an entry game is called quasi-symmetric
in distributions when firms have symmetric and anonymous profit functions, and
their distributions of types, Fi (vi ), are ordered in terms of first order stochastic
dominance (FOSD). Without loss of generality, we order firms so they satisfy
Fi (v) ≤ Fi+1 (v) for all v. Similarly, a game is quasi-symmetric in profit when firms
have symmetric distributions of types and anonymous profit functions that for any
realization ve , satisfy πi (v, vne −1 ) ≥ πi+1 (v, vne −1 ), where vr is an r-dimensional
vector of realized types and ne is the number of entrants in e.19
Quasi-symmetry is a common assumption in empirical applications. In the
context of complete information entry games, quasi-symmetry has been used as an
equilibrium selection criteria when multiplicity of equilibria exists. For example,
Berry (1992) uses a quasi-symmetric in profit model, in which firms with lower
entry costs are assumed to enter first (see also Jia, 2008, which uses profitability as
a selection criterion). In the context of private information, Roberts and Sweeting
(2013, 2016) use a model in which firms are quasi-symmetric in distributions; and
Vitorino (2012) uses a linear model in which firms are quasi-symmetric in payoffs.20
Lemma 2. Suppose an entry game in which firms are quasi-symmetric (either in
profit or distribution). Then, firms are ordered by strength, with si < si+1 ; that is,
firm 1 is the strongest and firm n the weakest.
19

Our results below also extend to environments in which firms are ranked consistently in both
dimensions; i.e., Fi (v) ≤ Fi+1 (v) for all v and πi (v, vne −1 ) ≥ πi+1 (v, vne −1 ) for all ve .
20
In a context of entry into a second-price auction without selection, Tan and Yilankaya (2006)
and Cao and Tian (2013) study equilibrium uniqueness in quasi-symmetric environments under
the restriction that bidders belong to one of two possible groups.
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The previous lemma shows that the firms’ ranking provided by strength coincides with the order given by quasi-symmetry. Reinforcing the idea that strength
is the right notion to measure the firms’ relative competitiveness. The following
theorem is the main result of this section.
Theorem 2. In quasi-symmetric entry games, there always exists a herculean
equilibrium. Moreover, a herculean equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the
game if the following condition holds
(n − 1)

fi (xi ) ∆i,j (x)
<1
Fi (xi ) Π0i (x)

(9)

for every pair of firms i, j and every vector x such that each dimension satisfies
xk ∈ [v k , v k ], and the game is: i) quasi-symmetric in profit or, ii) quasi-symmetric
in distribution and the profit loss does not depend on the type of competitors, i.e.,
δi,j (xi , xj , ve\i ) = δi (xi , ne ).
As in the previous two environments, a herculean equilibrium always exists.
Furthermore, the herculean equilibrium: i) coincides with the symmetric equilibrium when the game is symmetric; ii) coincides with intuitive cutoff orders in games
with more than two groups of players when such order exists, and; iii) in a two
group scenario, is defined when no intuitive order exists. Therefore, the herculean
equilibrium would be useful for empirical analysis.
Observe that Theorem 2 is not a particular case nor a generalization of Theorem 1. While the former can handle more than two groups of asymmetric firms,
the latter allows for more degree of firm heterogeneity between the two groups.
There are also differences in the sufficient condition for uniqueness. The induction
method used in the proof of Theorem 2 needs to handle simultaneous deviations
by each of the n − 1 competitors in the game, independently of whether a subset of firms are symmetric or not. Theorem 1, on the other hand, exploits the
within-group symmetry to provide a weaker sufficient condition.
Although Theorem 2 says that condition (9) needs to hold for every pair of
potential entrants, the quasi-symmetric structure usually translates in that the
condition needs to be checked only for a specific pair of firms. As illustrated in
the examples below, this is always true for the linear model in example 1; if the
condition holds for a particular pair of firms, it holds for every other pair. Which
these two firms are, depends on the type of quasi-symmetry.
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Example 7 (Linear model). Consider the following linear model (Example 1)
πi (ve ) = ηi − (ne − 1)δi + vi .
where vi distributes N (µi , 1). We explore sufficient condition (9) under different
forms of quasi-symmetry. Start by observing that the profit loss is independent of
the type and number of competitors, as δi,j (xi , xj , ve\i ) = δi . This holds regardless
of the game being quasi-symmetric in profit or in distribution; thus, for uniqueness,
we only need to verify condition (9). Using the log-concavity property of the normal
distribution, condition (9) holds if, for every pair of firms i and j, the following
inequality is satisfied
(n − 1)δi Fj (v j )

fi (v i )
< 1,
Fi (v i )

(10)

where v i = −ηi and v i = (n − 1)δi − ηi . We show that, in linear-quasi-symmetric
environments, if condition (9) holds for one (specific) pair of firms, it holds for
every pair of firms.
(a) Quasi-symmetric in distribution. Suppose δi = δ and ηi = η for every firm i. That is, firms are quasi-symmetric in distribution, where firms are
ordered by the mean of their type distribution µi with the strongest firm having the highest µi . In this scenario, sufficient condition (10) simplifies to (n −
1)δFj (v)fi (v)/Fi (v) < 1. Using that, for a given v, the inverted hazard rate increases in µi and stochastic dominance (Fn (v) ≥ Fi (v) for all i), the condition
holds for every pair of firms, if it holds for i = 1 and j = n.
(b) Quasi-symmetric in profit I. Suppose instead that δi = δ and µi = µ
for every firm i. Firms are quasi-symmetric in profit, where the strongest firms
has the highest value of ηi . In this scenario, sufficient condition (10) becomes
(n − 1)δF (v j )f (v i )/F (v i ) < 1. Because the inverted hazard rate is decreasing in
vi , the condition holds for every pair of firms, if it holds for i = 1 and j = n (as
v 1 ≤ v i and v n ≥ v i for all i).
(c) Quasi-symmetric in profit II. Finally, suppose that ηi = η and µi = µ
for every firm i. Firms, then, are quasi-symmetric in profit, where the strongest
firm is the less sensitive to entry (has a lower δi ). In this scenario v i = −η
for every i, and condition (10) becomes (n − 1)δi F (v j )f (−η)/F (−η) < 1. Because the two weakest firms are the ones with the highest δi and v j , pick κ =
max{δn F (v n−1 ), δn−1 F (v n )} and the condition holds for every pair of firms, if
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(n − 1)κf (−η)/F (−η) < 1.

5

Concluding Remarks

In this article, we developed a sufficient condition guaranteeing equilibrium uniqueness in the context of entry games under private information. The proposed framework embeds most of the existing entry models studied in the literature, accommodating various forms of firm heterogeneity and selection. With the aid of strength
we are able to identify the herculean equilibrium; the type of equilibrium that
remains when the games has a unique equilibrium. Strength can reduce the computational burden of calculating equilibria with heterogeneous firms, as it provides
bounds for the herculean equilibrium.
When further exploring the set of sufficient conditions provided, we put special
emphasis to models in which private information enters the payoffs linearly. The
linear model is the most common model used in the applied literature. There, the
proposed conditions reduce to a set of simple calculations. The conditions provide
clear intuitions on how competition among firms affects the possibility of having a
unique equilibrium. We used our sufficient conditions jointly with the estimates in
empirical articles to illustrate that their empirical model have a unique equilibrium,
demonstrating the usefulness of the results.
The focus of this article is on static entry games with private information. We
put special emphasis in developing a framework that embeds most of the applied
work on endogenous market formation. Beyond the results presented, we see these
new developments as the starting point to study equilibrium uniqueness in dynamics games with entry. We hope the tools developed here enable further research in
dynamic environments.
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Figure 1: Construction of a herculean equilibrium from iterated best responses. Starting from firm 2’s strength, s2 , firm 1’s best response is lower than its own strength, s1 .
Similarly, firm 2’s best response to firm 1’s best response is higher than s2 . These iterated
best responses are monotonic and bounded, converging to a herculean equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium uniqueness in a symmetric linear model with a standard typeI extreme value distribution. Area outside curves represents the set of parameters δ
and η that deliver a unique equilibrium. In Panel (a), the set of parameters satisfying
uniqueness shrinks with the number of potential entrants, n. In Panel (b), the set reacts
non-monotonically. Restriction fades away when n becomes unboundedly large.
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Figure 3: Strength and Herculean equilibrium in a linear model with two asymmetric
firms and type-I extreme value distributions; λ1 varies and δ1 = 1 and δ2 = λ2 = 5/4.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium uniqueness (shaded area) – linear model with asymmetric firms
and type-I extreme value distributions.
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Appendix
A

Omitted Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1. We show that si exists and that σi (s) single crosses zero.
Existence: Observe that assumptions A4 and A2 jointly imply σi (v i ) < 0. Similarly,
assumption A4 and Lemma B.1 (see Appendix B) imply, σi (v i ) ≥ Πi (v i , a−i ) > 0. Then,
by the Intermediate value Theorem, there exist ŝ such that σi (ŝ) = 0.
Uniqueness: By Lemma B.1 and the chain rule, we have that σi0 (s) > 0. Thus, σi (s)
single crosses zero; i.e., there is a unique value si satisfying σi (si ) = 0.

Proof of Proposition 1. This proof makes use of Lemma A.1, presented below.
Lemma A.1. Under condition (4), two symmetric firms that best respond to each other
must play the same cutoff strategy.
Proof. Consider two symmetric firms, p and q, and fix any profile of cutoffs strategies
x−p,q for the rest of the firms. Define Πp,q (y, x) ≡ Πp (xp = x, xq = y, x−p,q ) where
Πp (x) is the function defined in (1). Πp,q (x, y) represents p’s expected profit of entering
the market under valuation x when q plays the entry cutoff y and all other firms play
according to x−p,q . The equilibrium condition for firm p holds whenever there exists x
and y such that Πp,q (x, y) = 0. Define b(x) to be the value of y such that Πp,q (x, b(x)) = 0;
i.e., b(x) is q’s best response to x. By Lemma B.2 in Appendix B, b(x) exists and is
uniquely defined for each x. To prove the Lemma we need to prove three claims.
Claim 1. There exists a unique equilibrium such that x = y.
Proof. Start by assuming that symmetric firms play symmetric cutoffs; i.e., x = y = z.
Define σ̂(z) = Πp,q (z, z) and observe that, by symmetry among firms, σ̂(z) = Πq,p (z, z).
Thus, if the equilibrium condition is satisfied by firm p, it is also satisfied by firm q. A
p,q-symmetric equilibrium exists whenever σ̂(z) = 0. We show that there exists a unique
value ẑ such that σ̂(ẑ) = 0. Following analogous steps to those in Lemma 1, it is easy
to show σ̂(v p ) < 0 and σ̂(v p ) > 0; so that, there exists ẑ such that σ̂(ẑ) = 0. Using
Lemma B.1, we can show that σ̂ 0 (z) > 0. Hence, the value ẑ is unique.

f (x) F (b(x))
21
0
Claim 2. Under condition (4): 0 > b (x) > − F (x) f (b(x)) .
Proof. Let x = (x, b(x), x−p,q ). Using implicit differentiation and equations (B.1) and
(B.2) from Lemma B.1, we obtain

dΠq,p (b(x), x) dΠq,p (b(x), x)
f (x) ∆q,p (x)
0
=−
b (x) = −
dx
dy
F (x) Π0q (x)
which is negative as the denominator and numerator are positive. To obtain the lower
bound for b0 (x) simply use condition (4).

Claim 3. An increase in x, which q best responds by playing b(x), leads firm p to strictly
increase its profit; i.e., Πp,q (x, b(x)) is increasing in x.
Proof. Differentiating Πp,q (x, b(x)) with respect to x, using the chain rule, and equations
21

For ease in notation we drop sub-indexes from F when referring to firms p and q.
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(B.1) and (B.2) we obtain
dΠp,q
∂Πp,q
db(x) ∂Πp,q
=
+
dx
∂x
dx ∂y
f (b(x))
db(x)
f (x)
= Π0q (x) +
∆p,q (x) > Π02 (x) −
∆p,q (x) > 0,
dx F (b(x))
F (x)
where x = (x, b(x), x−p,q ). The first inequality follows from Claim 2, whereas the second
from condition (4); which proves the claim.

We prove Lemma A.1 by contradiction. Recall that x−p,q is fixed throughout the
proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, that there exists y < x constituting an
equilibrium. By Claim 1 there exists a unique value ẑ such that σ̂(ẑ) = 0. Suppose first
y < ẑ < x. Because
σ̂(ẑ) = Πp,q (ẑ, ẑ) = Πp,q (ẑ, b(ẑ)) = 0,
Claim 3 implies that we must have Πp,q (x, b(x) = y) > 0 as x > ẑ, which contradicts
(x, y) being an equilibrium. Suppose now y < x < ẑ. Lemma B.1 and Claim 1 imply
0 = σ̂(ẑ) > σ̂(x) = Πp,q (x, x) > Πp,q (x, y)
which contradicts (x, y) being an equilibrium. Analogous argument can be constructed
for the case ẑ < y < x, proving the Lemma.

To prove the proposition observe: (i) By Lemma 1, there exists a unique value of
strength and, therefore, a unique symmetric equilibrium, which also corresponds to the
unique herculean equilibrium. (ii) If firms are not playing a symmetric equilibrium, then
there must exists two symmetric firms best-responding to each other but playing different
cutoffs, contradicting Lemma A.1.

Proof of Theorem 1.
Proof preliminaries: If s1 = s2 the herculean equilibrium
corresponds to the strength of the firms. Assume, without loss of generality, that s1 < s2 .
Let x̂ = (x1 , x1 , . . . , x1 , x2 , x2 , . . . , x2 ) be a vector of group-symmetric cutoff strategies.
Pick any firm i ∈ G1 and let Π̂1 (x1 , x2 ) = Πi (x̂) represent a firm in group one’s expected
profit of entering under valuation x1 when firms play group-symmetric strategies x1 and
x2 .Define b1 (x) to be the function that solves Π̂1 (b1 (x), x) = 0. Thus, b1 (x) corresponds
to group one’s symmetric best response to group two playing the group-symmetric cutoff
x. By Lemma B.2, the value b1 (x) exists and is unique; i.e., b1 (x) is well defined.
F1 (b1 (x))
Claim 4. b1 (s1 ) = s1 and, under sufficient condition (7), 0 > b01 (x) > − Ff22(x)
(x) f1 (b1 (x)) .
Proof. By definition of strength we know Π̂1 (s1 , s1 ) = 0, therefore b1 (s1 ) = s1 . Using implicit differentiation, the chain rule, that groups member are symmetric, and Lemma B.1
b01 (x)

=

dΠ̂1 (b1 (x),x)
dx2
−
dΠ̂1 (b1 (x),x)
dx1

= − ∂Π

∂Π1 (x̂)
n2 ∂x
j∈G
2

1 (x̂)

∂x1

∂Π1 (x̂)
+ (n1 − 1) ∂x
j∈G
1

=−

2)
n2 Ff22(x
(x2 ) ∆1,2 (x̂)
1)
Π01 (x̂) + (n1 − 1) Ff11(x
(x1 ) ∆1,1 (x̂)

where ∆i,j (x), defined in equation (3), represents the profit loss of firm i when a firm
in group j enters the market with type xj . Because numerator and denominator are
positive, the equation above proves b01 (x) < 0 for all x. For the lower bound of b1 (x)
observe that ∆1,1 > 0. Take a lower bound for b01 (x) by making ∆1,1 zero. The lower
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F1 (b1 (x))
bound b01 (x) > − Ff22(x)

(x) f1 (b1 (x)) follows by using sufficient condition (7).
Existence of a herculean equilibrium: Define the function h2 : [s1 , ∞) → R by h2 (x) =
Π̂2 (b1 (x), x). This function is continuous and corresponds to the expected profit of a
firm in group 2 when it enters the market under valuation x, group two plays the groupsymmetric cutoff x, and group one plays their group-symmetric best response b1 (x).
Define x2 to be the value satisfying h2 (x2 ) = 0 and let x1 = b1 (x2 ). The next two claims
prove that an herculean equilibrium (x1 < x2 ) exists, x1 < s1 , and x2 > s2 .
Claim 5. x2 ∈ (s1 , ∞) is necessary and sufficient for x1 < x2 .
Proof. Because b1 (x) is decreasing in x and b1 (s1 ) = s1 , we have that x1 = b1 (x2 ) <
s1 < x2 if and only if x2 > s1 .

Claim 6. h2 (s2 ) < 0 and there exists x̂ > s2 such that h2 (x̂) > 0. Thus, by the
intermediate value theorem, the herculean equilibrium cutoff x2 ∈ (s2 , x̂) exists.
Proof. Because group two is weak, and b1 (x) is decreasing in x, we know that b1 (s2 ) <
b1 (s1 ) = s1 < s2 (where Claim 4 was used in the equality). Lemma B.1 and the definition
of strength implies h2 (s2 ) = Π̂2 (b1 (s2 ), s2 ) < Π̂2 (s2 , s2 ) = 0, proving h2 (s2 ) < 0. For
the second part of the claim, observe that, by Lemma B.1, Π̂2 (x1 , x2 ) is increasing in x;
then, Π̂2 (b1 (x), x) ≥ Π̂2 (a, x) for all x. Take x̂ = v 2 and observe that, by assumption
A4, Π̂2 (a, x̂) > 0, proving the result.

Uniqueness of equilibrium: Start by observing that, under condition (6), Lemma A.1
applies. Therefore, it is without loss to restrict the analysis to group-symmetric strategies. To prove uniqueness, then, we need to show that no other herculean equilibrium
exists and that we can not have an equilibrium where x2 < x1 .
Claim 7. There exists a unique herculean equilibrium.
Proof. To prove uniqueness within the herculean class, we shown h02 (x) > 0 so that h2 (x)
single crosses zero from below. Recall x̂ = (b1 (x), . . . , b1 (x), x, . . . , x). Differentiating
h2 (x), using the chain rule, and that firms play group-symmetric strategies, we obtain

∂Π02 (x̂)
∂Π0 (x̂)
+ b0 (x)n1 2
∂x2
∂x1
f2 (x)
f2 (x)
f2 (x)
∆2,2 (x̂) − n1
∆2,1 (x̂) > (n2 − 1)
∆2,2 (x̂) > 0,
> Π02 (x̂) + (n2 − 1)
F2 (x)
F2 (x)
F2 (x)

h02 (x) = Π02 (x̂) + (n2 − 1)

where the first inequality follows from using Lemma B.1 and the bound in Claim 4. The
second inequality follows from sufficient condition (7). Proving that the derivative is
positive and uniqueness within the herculean class.

Claim 8. There is no group-symmetric equilibrium in which the strong group plays a
higher cutoff than the weak group.
Proof. We show that no non-herculean equilibrium—i.e., x1 > x2 but s1 < s2 —can
exist. Define b2 (x) to be the function that satisfies Π̂2 (x, b2 (x)) = 0; b2 (x) corresponds to
group two’s best response to the cutoff of group one when x1 = x. As before, Lemma B.2
implies that b2 (x) is well defined. Similarly, following the steps of Claim 4, it can be
shown: b2 (s2 ) = s2 , b02 (x) < 0 , and, under condition (7), b02 (x) is bounded below by
2 (b2 (x))
− Ff11(x)F
(x)f2 (b2 (x)) .
Define the continuous function h1 (x) = Π̂1 (x, b2 (x)) which corresponds to the expected profit of a firm in group one when entering the market under valuation x and its
opponents play the pair of group-symmetric strategies (x, b2 (x)). We show that there is
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no x satisfying x1 = x > b2 (x) = x2 and h1 (x) = 0; i.e., no non-herculean equilibrium
exists. Start by observing that x > b2 (x) if and only if x ∈ (s2 , ∞). In Lemma 1 we
showed the function σ1 (s) = Π̂1 (s, s) is strictly increasing in s. Then, by the definition
of strength and by firm two being weak (s1 < s2 ),
σ1 (s1 ) = Π̂1 (s1 , s1 ) = 0 < σ1 (s2 ) = Π̂1 (s2 , s2 ) = Π̂1 (s2 , b2 (s2 )) = h1 (s2 ),
showing that h1 (s2 ) > 0. Following analogous steps to those in Claim 7, which requires
using lower bound for b02 (x) and sufficient condition (7), we can show that h01 (x) > 0.
Then, because h1 (s2 ) > 0 and h01 (x) > 0 for all x, h1 (x) never crosses zero when x > s2
and the result follows.


Proof of Lemma 2. We start by showing the order in the context of quasi-symmetry
in profit. Let si be the strength of firm i, using (2) we obtain



Z b

X
Y


πi si , ve\i φ(ve\i )dne −1 ve\i
0 = σi (si ) =
F (si )


(si )j∈Ii (e)
e∈Ei
j∈Oi (e)



Z b

X
Y


>
F (si )
πi+1 si , ve\i φ(ve\i )dne −1 ve\i = σi+1 (si ),


(si )j∈I (e)
e∈Ei

j∈Oi (e)

i

where in the inequality we used πi (v, vne −1 ) > πi+1 (v, vne −1 ). In the last equality, after
chancing the profit identity, we used Ei = Ei+1 . Then, by Lemma 1, σi+1 (s) is increasing
in s and si+1 > si .
For quasi-symmetry in distribution, rewriting (2) we obtain



Z b

X 
Y

ne −1


0 = σi (si ) =
Fj (si )
π si , ve\i fi+1 (vi+1 )φ(ve\i,i+1 )d
ve\i


(si )j∈Ii (e)
e∈Ei ∩Ei+1
j∈Oi (e)



Z b

X 
Y

Fi+1 (si )
+
Fj (si )
π si , ve\i φ(ve\i )dne −1 ve\i


(si )j∈Ii (e)
e∈Ei \Ei+1
j∈Oi (e)\i+1



Z b

X 
Y


>
Fj (si )
π si , ve\i fi (vi )φ(ve\i,i+1 )dne −1 ve\i


(si )j∈Ii (e)
e∈Ei ∩Ei+1
j∈Oi (e)



Z b

X 
Y



+
Fi (si )
Fj (si )
π si , ve\i φ(ve\i )dne −1 ve\i = σi+1 (si ),


(si )j∈I (e)
e∈Ei \Ei+1

j∈Oi (e)\i

i

where the inequality uses two properties of FOSD. In the second term we used Fi (v) <
Rb
Rb
Fi+1 (v). In the first term, we used si h(v)fi (v)dv ≤ si h(v)fj (v)dv for any nonincreasing function h(x). Then, by Lemma 1, σi+1 (s) is increasing in s and si+1 > si . 
Proof of Theorem 2.
We present the proof when firms are quasi-symmetric in
distributions. The proof when firms are quasi-symmetric in profit is, basically, identical
but we can drop the subindices from the distribution functions. Using Lemma 2 we order
firms using stochastic dominance, from stronger (firm 1) to weakest (firm n).
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Existence of an herculean equilibrium. We prove existence by construction. For any
vector of cutoff strategies x and k ∈ {2, . . . , n} let xk = (xk , xk+1 , . . . , xn ). Construct as
follows:
 Firm 1: Define b11 (x2 ) to be firm’s 1 best response to x2 ; i.e., b11 (x2 ) satisfies
Π1 (b11 (x2 ), x2 ) = 0.
where Π1 (x) is defined in (1). By Lemma B.2 in the Auxiliary Result section, b11 (x2 )
exists and (the best response) is unique.
 Firm 2: Let Π̂2 (x2 ) = Π2 (b11 (x2 ), x2 ); that is, Π̂2 (x2 ) represents firm’s 2 profit after
incorporating that firm 1 is best responding to x2 . Define b22 (x3 ) to be a solution to
Π̂2 (b22 (x3 ), x3 ) = 0. By Lemma B.2, b22 (x3 ) exists. This function represents firm’s 2
best response when firms 1 and 2 are mutually best responding to each other and to
x3 . For ease in notation, denote firm’s 1 best response after incorporating firm’s 2
best response as b21 (x3 ) = b11 (b22 (x3 ), x3 ).22

Claim 9. For any x3 , b22 (x3 ) > b21 (x3 ).
Proof. Fix x3 and find the value x̂ that satisfies x̂ = b11 (x̂, x3 ). The value x̂ exists
by continuity of b11 (x2 ) and by b11 (x2 ) being bounded below and above by v 1 and v 1
respectively (by assumption A4). Then by Lemma B.3 in the auxiliary results section
we have Π2 (x̂, x̂, x3 ) < Π1 (x̂, x̂, x3 ) = 0. Define a pair of sequences {ym , zm }m∈N
satisfying: (i) y1 = z1 = x̂; (ii) ym+1 is the unique (by Lemma B.2) value that solves
Π2 (zm , ym+1 , x3 ) = 0 (i.e., ym+1 is firm’s 2 best response to the cutoffs (zm , x3 )) and;
(iii) zm+1 = b11 (ym+1 , x3 ). By definition, zm+1 solves Π1 (zm+1 , ym+1 , x3 ) = 0 and, by
Lemma B.2, the value zm+1 is also unique. We show that {ym }m∈N is increasing and
{zm }m∈N decreasing. Because Π2 (x̂, x̂, x3 ) < 0 and Π2 (x) being strictly increasing
in the 2nd dimension, y2 > y1 = x̂. Similarly, because (by Lemma B.1) Π1 (x) is
also increasing in the 2nd dimension, we have Π1 (z1 , y2 , x3 ) > 0, which implies z2 =
b11 (y2 , x3 ) < z1 = b11 (y1 , x3 ). This, in turn, implies (by Lemma B.3)
Π2 (z2 , y2 , x3 ) < Π1 (z2 , y2 , x3 ) = 0;
which implies y3 > y2 . By induction, the argument generalizes to an arbitrary step
m and the sequences {ym , zm }m∈N are monotonically increasing and decreasing respectively. By assumption A4, {ym }m∈N is bounded above by v 2 and {zm }m∈N is
bounded below by v 1 . Thus, the sequences converge to y∞ and z∞ , respectively. By
convergence, we have: (i) z∞ = b11 (y∞ , x3 ) and; (ii) Π2 (z∞ , y∞ , x3 ) = Π̂2 (y∞ , x3 ) = 0
(i.e., y∞ = b22 (x3 )). Thus, b11 (y∞ , x3 ) = b21 (x3 ) and, as z∞ < x̂ < y∞ , we have
b22 (x3 ) > b21 (x3 ).

 Firm k ≤ n: Suppose we have shown the existence of b`` (x`+1 ) for every ` ∈ {1, . . . , k−
` `+1 ), x`+1 ) for j ∈ {1, . . . , `}. Let
1} and have recursively defined b`j (x`+1 ) = b`−1
j (b` (x
k−1 k
k
k
Π̂k (xk ) = Πk (bk−1
1 (x ), . . . , bk−1 (x ), x ) represent firm’s k profit after incorporating
that every firm j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} is mutually best responding to each other and to
xk . Define bkk (xk+1 ) (observe that xk+1 is empty—i.e., a number, not a function—if
22

More generally, for j < k the notation bkj (xk ) represents firm’s j best response to xk after
incorporating the best response of every firm up to k.
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k = n) to be a solution to Π̂k (bkk (xk+1 ), xk+1 ) = 0. By Lemma B.2, bkk (xk ) exists. This
function represents firm’s k best response to xk+1 when every firm j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}
is mutually best responding to each other and to xk .
Claim 10. For any xk+1 , if firm k − 1 is stronger than k the solution bkk (xk+1 ) satisfies
bkk (xk+1 ) > bkk−1 (xk+1 ).
Proof. Fix any xk+1 and let bkk (xk+1 ) be one of the solutions found in the
 previous step.
k
k+1
k
k+1
k+1
Then define the vector of cutoffs x = b1 (x ), . . . , bk (x ), x
. Throughout
the proof, the vector of strategies for every firm except firm k and k − 1, x−k,k−1 ,
remains fixed (i.e., they are numbers not functions). Define x̂ to be a value satisfying
k+1 ). The value x̂ exists by continuity of bk−1 (xk ) and by bk−1 (xk ) being
x̂ = bk−1
k−1 (x̂, x
k−1
k−1
bounded below and above by v k−1 and v k−1 respectively (by assumption A4). By
definition of best response x̂ satisfies Πk−1 (x̂, x̂, x−k,k−1 ) = 0. Then, by Lemma B.3,
we have
Πk (x̂, x̂, x−k,k−1 ) < Πk−1 (x̂, x̂, x−k,k−1 ) = 0.
Define a pair of sequences {ym , zm }m∈N satisfying: (i) y1 = z1 = x̂; (ii) ym+1 is
the unique (by Lemma B.2) value that solves Πk (zm , ym+1 , x−k,k−1 ) = 0 (i.e., ym+1 is
k+1 ).
firm’s k best response to the cutoffs (zm , x−k,k−1 )) and; (iii) zm+1 = bk−1
k−1 (ym+1 , x
By definition, zm+1 solves Πk−1 (zm+1 , ym+1 , x−k,k−1 ) = 0 and, Lemma B.2, the value
zm+1 is also unique. We show that {ym }m∈N is increasing and {zm }m∈N decreasing.
Because Πk (x̂, x̂, x−k,k−1 ) < 0 and Πk (x) being strictly increasing in the kth dimension, y2 > y1 = x̂. Similarly, because (by Lemma B.1) Πk−1 (x) is also increasing in the
k+1 ) <
kth dimension, we have Πk−1 (x̂, y2 , x−k,k−1 ) > 0, which implies z2 = bk−1
k−1 (y2 , x
k+1 ) = z . This, in turn, implies (by Lemma B.3)
bk−1
1
k−1 (y1 , x
Πk (z2 , y2 , x−k,k−1 ) < Πk−1 (z2 , y2 , x−k,k−1 ) = 0,
which, in turns, implies y3 > y2 . By induction, the argument generalizes to an arbitrary step m and the sequences {ym , zm }m∈N are monotonically increasing and decreasing respectively. By assumption A4, {ym }m∈N is bounded above by v k and {zm }m∈N
is bounded below by v k−1 . Thus, the sequences converge to y∞ and z∞ , respectively.
k+1 ) and; (ii) Π (z , y , x
By convergence, we have: (i) z∞ = bk−1
k ∞ ∞
−k,k−1 ) =
k−1 (y∞ , x
k−1
k+1
k
k
k+1
Π̂k (y∞ , x−k,k−1 ) = 0 (i.e., y∞ = bk (x )). Thus, bk−1 (y∞ , x ) = bk−1 (xk+1 ) and,
as z∞ < x̂ < y∞ , we have bkk (xk+1 ) > bkk−1 (xk+1 ).

Thus, we have constructed an equilibrium vector x = (bn1 (xn ), . . . , bnn−1 (xn ), xn ) with the
property that xi < xi+1 ; i.e., a Herculean equilibrium.
Uniqueness within the herculean-equilibrium class: We show that at each step k of the
previous construction there is a unique best response xk = bkk (xk+1 ) to xk+1 .
 Firm 1: The uniqueness of b11 (x2 ) follows from Lemma B.2. The next result is needed
for subsequent steps.
Claim 11. Under condition (9), for every j ∈ {2, . . . , n}, db11 (x2 )/dxj satisfies:
fj (xj ) ∆1,j (x)
fj (xj ) F1 (x1 ) 1
db11 (x2 )
=−
.
>−
dxj
Fj (xj ) Π01 (x)
Fj (xj ) f1 (x1 ) n − 1
Fj (xj ) db11 (x2 )
Fq (xq ) db11 (x2 ) 1
<
for q ∈ {2, . . . , j − 1}
fj (xj ) dxj
fq (xq ) dxq n − 1

0>
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(A.1)
(A.2)

Proof. Let x = (b11 (x2 ), x2 ); using implicit differentiation and Lemma B.1 we obtain
∂Π1 (x)/∂xj
fj (xj ) ∆1,j (x)
db11 (x2 )
=−
=−
,
dxj
∂Π1 (x)/∂x1
Fj (xj ) Π01 (x)

(A.3)

which is negative as, ∆1,j (x) > 0 and Π1,j (x) > 0 for every x. The lower bound
in equation (A.1) follows from applying condition (9) into equation (A.3). Property
(A.2) follows from observing


∆1,q (x)
Fq (xq ) db11 (x2 ) 1
Fj (xj ) db11 (x2 )
1
∆1,j (x) −
= 0
> 0,
−
fq (xq ) dxq n − 1
fj (xj ) dxj
Π1 (x)
n−1
where the equality follows from substituting in equation (A.3), and the inequality
follows from Lemma B.4 and the fact that q ∈ {2, . . . , j − 1}.

 Firm 2: Fix x3 and let x = (b11 (x2 ), x2 ), we need to show that the best response b22 (x3 )
is unique. We do this by showing that Π̂2 (x2 ) = Π2 (b11 (x2 ), x2 ) is strictly increasing in
x2 ; so that, Π̂2 (x2 , x3 ) single crosses zero and there is a unique value b22 (x3 ) satisfying
Π̂2 (b22 (x3 ), x3 ) = 0. Using the chain rule and equation (B.2)

Π̂02 (x2 ) = Π02 (x) +

db11 (x2 ) dΠ2
db1 (x2 ) f1 (b11 (x2 ))
= Π02 (x) + 1
∆2,1 (x)
dx2 dx1
dx2 F1 (b11 (x2 ))
f2 (x2 ) ∆2,1 (x)
> 0,
> Π02 (x) −
F2 (x2 ) n − 1

(A.4)

where in the first inequality follows from the lower bound in equation (A.1) and the
second inequality follows from sufficient condition (9). This proves uniqueness of the
best response. The next result is needed for the induction argument in the proof.
Claim 12. Let b21 (x3 ) = b11 (b22 (x3 ), x3 ). Under condition (9), for every j ∈ {3, . . . , n}
and ` ∈ {1, 2}, db2` (x3 )/dxj satisfies:
db1 (x2 )

f (x )

f1 (x1 )
j j
1
db22 (x3 )
Fj (xj ) ∆2,j (x) + dxj F1 (x1 ) ∆2,1 (x)
=−
db1 (x2 ) f1 (x1 )
dxj
Π0 (x) + 1
∆ (x)
2

dx2

F1 (x1 )

(A.5)

2,1

db2` (x3 )

fj (xj ) F` (x` ) 1
>−
and,
dxj
Fj (xj ) f` (x` ) n − 1
Fj (xj ) db22 (x3 )
Fq (xq ) db22 (x3 ) 1
<
for q ∈ {3, . . . , j − 1}
fj (xj ) dxj
fq (xq ) dxq n − 1

0>

(A.6)
(A.7)

Proof. To show equation (A.5) use implicit differentiation, the chain rule, and equation
(B.2) to obtain
db11 (x2 ) dΠ2
dxj dx1

dΠ̂2
dΠ2
db22 (x3 )
dx
dxj +
=− j =−
dΠ̂2
dxj
Π0 (x) +
dx2

2

db11 (x2 ) dΠ2
dx2 dx1

=−

fj (xj )
Fj (xj ) ∆2,j (x)

Π02 (x) +

+

db11 (x2 ) f1 (x1 )
dxj F1 (x1 ) ∆2,1 (x)

db11 (x2 ) f1 (x1 )
dx2 F1 (x1 ) ∆2,1 (x)

.

Observe, by equation (A.4), that the denominator is positive. Using lower bound
(A.1) and Lemma B.4 we can see that the numerator is also positive, implying that
the derivative is negative; which proves the upper bound of (A.6) when ` = 2. For
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the lower bound of equation (A.6) when ` = 2, using equation (A.5), observe that
equation (A.6) holds if and only if the following expression is positive:


fj (xj )
F2 (x2 ) Π02 (x)
− ∆2,j (x) +
Fj (xj )
f2 (x2 ) n − 1



Fj (xj ) db11 (x2 )
f1 (x1 ) F2 (x2 ) db11 (x2 ) 1
∆2,1 (x) .
−
F1 (x1 ) f2 (x2 ) dx2 n − 1
fj (xj ) dxj
The first round bracket is positive by sufficient condition (9). The second round
bracket is positive by property (A.2). Thus, the expression is indeed positive and the
lower bound in equation (A.6) holds.
We now prove the bounds of (A.6) when ` = 1. Using b21 (x3 ) = b11 (b22 (x3 ), x3 ), observe
db21 (x3 )
db1 (x2 ) db11 (x2 ) db22 (x3 )
= 1
+
.
dxj
dxj
dx2
dxj

(A.8)

Using (A.3) to substitute for db11 (x2 )/dx` with ` ∈ {2, j} and using the lower bound
in equation (A.6) when ` = 2, we obtain the following upper bound:


fj (xj ) 1
∆1,2 (x)
db21 (x3 )
<
− ∆1,j (x) < 0,
dxj
Fj (xj ) Π01 (x) n − 1
the inequality follows from Lemma B.4; proving the upper bound. The lower bound
in equation (A.6) follows from using equation (A.8) and observing
fj (xj ) F1 (x1 ) 1
db21 (x3 )
db1 (x2 )
> 1
>−
,
dxj
dxj
F (xj ) f1 (x1 ) n − 1
where the inequalities follow from db22 (x3 )/dxj · db11 (x2 )/dx2 > 0 and equation (A.1),
respectively.
Finally, to prove property (A.7) use equation (A.5) to write
Fq (xq ) db22 (x3 ) 1
Fj (xj ) db22 (x3 )
−
=
fq (xq ) dxq n − 1
fj (xj ) dxj




∆2,q (x)
f1 (x1 ) Fj (xj ) db11 (x2 ) Fq (xq ) db11 (x2 ) 1
1
∆2,j (x) −
+
−
∆2,1 (x) ,
D2
n−1
F1 (x1 ) fj (xj ) dxj
fq (xq ) dxq n − 1
db1 (x2 )

f1 (x1 )
1
where D2 = Π02 (x) + dx
F1 (x1 ) ∆2,1 (x) > 0. We show that a lower bound of this
2
expression is positive. Taking −db11 (x2 )/dxq > 0 to zero, we obtain


∆2,q (x)
1
f1 (x1 ) Fj (xj ) db11 (x2 )
∆2,j (x) −
+
∆2,1 (x)
D2
n−1
F1 (x1 ) fj (xj ) dxj




∆2,q (x) ∆2,1 (x)
2∆2,q (x)
1
1
>
∆2,j (x) −
−
>
∆2,j (x) −
> 0.
D2
n−1
n−1
D2
n−1

The first inequality follows from using lower bound (A.1). The other two inequalities
follow from Lemma B.4 and the fact that q ∈ {2, . . . , j − 1}.
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 Firm k ∈ {3, . . . , n}: Suppose that, for every p ∈ {1, . . . , k −1} and j ∈ {p+1, . . . , n},
we have proven that: bpp (xp+1 ) is unique;

0>

dbpp (xk )
dxj

=−

Pp−1 dbp−1
(xp ) f` (x` )
`
+ `=1
dxj
F` (x` ) ∆p,` (x)
;
p−1
Pp−1 db` (xp ) f` (x` )
Π0p (x) + `=1
∆
(x)
p,`
dxp
F` (x` )

fj (xj )
Fj (xj ) ∆p,j (x)

(A.9)

fj (xj ) Fq (xq ) 1
dbpq (xk )
>−
for q ∈ {1, . . . , p} and;
dxj
Fj (xj ) fq (xq ) n − 1
Fq (xq ) dbpp (xp+1 ) 1
Fj (xj ) dbpp (xp+1 )
<
for q ∈ {p + 1, . . . , j − 1}.
fj (xj )
dxj
fq (xq )
dxq
n−1

0>

(A.10)
(A.11)

k−1 k
k
k
Fix xk+1 and let x = (bk−1
1 (x ), . . . , bk−1 (x ), x ). We show that the best response
bkk (xk+1 ) is unique by showing that Π̂k (xk ) is strictly increasing in xk . Differentiating,

Π̂0k (xk ) = Π0k (x) +

k−1
X
dbk−1 (xk ) f` (x` )
`

`=1

dxk

F` (x` )

∆k,` (x)

k−1

>

Π0k (x)

fk (xk ) (k − 1)∆k,k−1 (x)
fk (xk ) X ∆k,` (x)
> Π0k (x) −
> 0,
−
Fk (xk )
n−1
Fk (xk )
n−1
`=1

where the inequalities follow from lower bound (A.10), Lemma B.4 and, sufficient
condition (9), respectively. This proves uniqueness of the best response. The next
result completes the induction argument.
Claim 13. Under condition (9), for every j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , m} and p ∈ {1, . . . , k},
dbkp (xk+1 )/dxj satisfies
dbkk (xk+1 )
dxj
0>

=−

P
dbk−1
(xk ) f` (x` )
`
+ k−1
`=1
dxj
F` (x` ) ∆k,` (x)
k−1
P
db` (xk ) f` (x` )
Π0k (x) + k−1
`=1
dxk
F` (x` ) ∆k,` (x)

fj (xj )
Fj (xj ) ∆k,j (x)

dbkp (xk+1 )
fj (xj ) Fp (xp ) 1
>−
dxj
Fj (xj ) fp (xp ) n − 1

(A.12)

and,

Fj (xj ) dbkk (xk+1 )
Fq (xq ) dbkk (xk+1 ) 1
<
fj (xj )
dxj
fq (xq )
dxq
n−1

(A.13)

for q ∈ {k + 1, . . . , j − 1}

(A.14)

Proof. To show equation (A.12) use the implicit differentiation, the chain rule, and
equation (B.2) to obtain
Pk−1 db`k−1 (xk ) dΠk (x)
dΠk (x)
dbkk (xk+1 )
∂ Π̂k (x)/∂xj
`=1
dxj +
dxj
dx`
=−
=−
.
k−1 k
P
db
(x ) dΠk (x)
dxj
∂ Π̂k (x)/∂xk
Π0 (x) + k−1 `
k

=−

fj (xj )
Fj (xj ) ∆k,j (x)

Π0k (x) +

`=1

dxk

dx`

db`k−1 (xk ) f` (x` )
`=1
dxj
F` (x` ) ∆k,` (x)

Pk−1

+
Pk−1

db`k−1 (xk ) f` (x` )
`=1
dxk
F` (x` ) ∆k,` (x)

.

We already showed that the denominator is positive. We show that a lower bound
of the numerator is positive, which immediately implies the upper bound in equation

42

(A.13) for the case when p = k. Using equation (A.10) a lower bound for the numerator
is


k−1
(k − 1)∆k,k−1 (x)
fj (xj )
fj (xj ) X ∆k,` (x)
fj (xj )
∆k,j (x) −
> 0,
∆k,j (x) −
>
Fj (xj )
Fj (xj )
n−1
Fj (xj )
n−1
`=1

where both inequalities follows from Lemma B.4. Thus, the numerator is positive.
For the lower bound in equation (A.13) in the case p = k, replace (A.12) into (A.13)
and observe that the inequality holds if and only if the following expression is positive


fj (xj )
Fk (xk ) Π0k (x)
− ∆k,j (x) +
Fj (xj )
fk (xk ) n − 1
!
#
k−1
X
(xk )
(xk ) 1
Fj (xj ) dbk−1
f` (x` ) Fk (xk ) dbk−1
`
`
∆k,` (x) . (A.15)
−
F` (x` ) fk (xk )
dxk
n−1
fj (xj )
dxj
`=1

The first term in round brackets is positive due to sufficient condition (9). We now
work with the summation and show that it is also positive. Before doing this, observe
that, by definition, for every ` ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}
bk` (xk+1 ) = b`` (bk`+1 (xk+1 ), bk`+2 (xk+1 ), . . . , bkk (xk+1 ), xk+1 ).
Then, for any j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , m}
k
X
dbk` (xk+1 )
db`` (x`+1 )
db`` (x`+1 ) dbkq (xk+1 )
=
+
.
dxj
dxj
dxq
dxj

(A.16)

q=`+1

For a given ` in the summation in equation (A.15), we use equation (A.16) to write
the round bracket as


Fj (xj ) db`` (x`+1 )
Fk (xk ) db`` (x`+1 ) 1
−
+
fk (xk )
dxk
n−1
fj (xj )
dxj
!
k−1
k)
X
(x
db`` (x`+1 ) Fk (xk ) dbqk−1 (xk ) 1
Fj (xj ) dbk−1
q
−
. (A.17)
dxq
fk (xk )
dxk
n−1
fj (xj )
dxj
q=`+1

Substitute equation (A.17) when ` = 1 into the summation in equation (A.15) to
obtain
!

k−1 
k−1 k
k)
X
(x
db
(x
)
F
(x
)
f` (x` )
db11 (x2 )
Fk (xk ) dbk−1
1
j
j
`
`
∆k,` (x) +
a1
−
F` (x` )
dx2
fk (xk )
dxk
n−1
fj (xj )
dxj
`=2


Fj (xj ) db11 (xk )
Fk (xk ) db11 (xk ) 1
+ a1
−
,
(A.18)
fk (xk ) dxk n − 1
fj (xj ) dxj
1)
where a1 = ∆k,1 (x) Ff11(x
(x1 ) > 0. Then, substituting (in increasing order) into equation
(A.18) the expression (A.17) for ` = 2, ` = 3 until ` = k − 1, we obtain that the
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summation in equation (A.15) is equal to
k−1
X


a`

`=1

Fj (xj ) db`` (x`+1 )
Fk (xk ) db`` (x`+1 ) 1
−
fk (xk )
dxk
n−1
fj (xj )
dxj

where


> 0,

(A.19)

`−1

X dbpp (xp+1 )
f` (x` )
a` =
∆k,` (x) +
ap
F` (x` )
dx`

(A.20)

p=1

is defined recursively. The parenthesis in equation (A.19) is positive by equation
(A.11). We show that each a` is positive, which proves the lower bound in equation
(A.13) when p = k. By induction, suppose that for every p ∈ {1, . . . , ` − 1} we
have shown that (fp (xp )/Fp (xp ))∆k,p (x) ≤ ap > 0 (we already showed this for a1 ).
We need to show that the same inequalities hold for equation (A.20). First, because
dbpp (xp+1 )/dx` < 0 and ap > 0 (by induction hypothesis) it is easy to see that a` <
(f` (x` )/F` (x` ))∆k,` (x). Using the lower bound in equation (A.10) and the upper
bound for ap we obtain the following lower bound for equation (A.20)




`−1
X
∆k,p (x) 
f` (x` ) 
f` (x` )
(` − 1)
al >
∆k,` (x) −
>
1−
∆k,` (x) > 0,
F` (x` )
n−1
F` (x` )
n−1
p=1

where the second inequality follows from Lemma B.4; which proves the result.
To prove the upper bound in equation (A.13) for p ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} we proceed by
induction downwards. Suppose that for every firm ` ∈ {p + 1, . . . , k} we have proven
0>

dbk` (xk+1 )
fj (xj ) F` (x` ) 1
>−
dxj
Fj (xj ) f` (x` ) n − 1

(A.21)

we prove that equation (A.13) holds for p. Observing that, in (A.16), dbpp (xp+1 )/dx` <
0 we can construct an upper bound for dbkp (xk+1 )/dxj using the induction hypothesis
(A.21)
k
X
dbkp (xk+1 )
dbpp (xp+1 )
dbpp (xp+1 ) fj (xj ) F` (x` ) 1
<
−
dxj
dxj
dx`
Fj (xj ) f` (x` ) n − 1
`=p+1

Using equation (A.9), the upper bound for dbkp (xk+1 )/dxj is equal to


p−1
k
p ) f (x )
X
1 fj (xj ) X  f` (x` )
dbp−1
(x
F` (x` ) 1
q
q q
∆p,` (x) +
∆p,q (x)
Dp Fj (xj )
F` (x` )
dx`
Fq (xq )
f` (x` ) n − 1
q=1
`=p+1


p−1
p ) F (x )
Fj (xj ) X dbp−1
1 fj (xj ) 
(x
q
q q
−
∆p,j (x) +
∆p,q (x)
Dp Fj (xj )
fj (xj )
dxj
fq (xq )
q=1

dbp−1
(xp ) fq (xq )
q
q=1
dxp
Fq (xq ) ∆p,q (x) > 0.
p−1 p
dbq (x )/dxj < 0 to the lower bound

where Dp = Π0p (x) +

Pp−1

p
Taking dbp−1
q (x )/dx` < 0

equal to zero and
in equation (A.10), we build
the following upper bound for the previous expression (and omitting Dp , as it does
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not affect the sign)




p−1
k
X
X
∆p,` (x)
fj (xj ) 
∆p,q (x)
fj (xj ) k − 1

+
− ∆p,j (x) <
− 1 ∆p,j (x) ≤ 0.
Fj (xj )
n−1
n−1
Fj (xj ) n − 1
q=1

`=p+1

The inequality follows from equation Lemma B.4; proving dbkp (xk+1 )/dxj < 0.
The lower bound for dbkp (xk+1 )/dxj follows from equation (A.16) and observing
dbkp (xk+1 )
fj (xj ) Fp (xp ) 1
dbpp (xp+1 )
>
>−
dxj
dxj
F (xj ) fp (xp ) n − 1
where the first inequality follows from (dbpp (xk+1 )/dx` ) · (dbk` (xk+1 )/dxj ) > 0 for every
`, and the second from the lower bound in equation (A.10).
Finally, we prove equation (A.14) using equation (A.12) to write

∆k,q (x)
Fq (xq ) dbkk (xk+1 ) 1
Fj (xj ) dbkk (xk+1 )
1
−
+
∆k,j (x) −
=
fq (xq )
dxq
n−1
fj (xj )
dxj
Dk
n−1
!
#
k−1
k)
X
(x
f` (x` ) Fj (xj ) db`k−1 (xk ) Fq (xq ) dbk−1
1
`
−
∆k,` (x) ,
F` (x` ) fj (xj )
dxj
fq (xq )
dxq
n−1
`=1

where Dk = Π0k (x) +

Pk−1
`=1

dbk−1
(xk ) f` (x` )
`
dxk
F` (x` ) ∆k,` (x) > 0. We show that a lower bound of
(xk )/dxj < 0
(xk )/dxq > 0 to zero and dbk−1
Taking −dbk−1
`
`

this expression is positive.
to the lower bound in equation (A.10), we obtain
"
#


k−1
∆k,q (x) X ∆k,` (x)
k∆k,q (x)
1
1
∆k,j (x) −
−
∆k,j (x) −
> 0.
>
Dk
n−1
n−1
D
n−1
`=1

The inequalities follow from Lemma B.4 and the fact that q ∈ {k, . . . , j − 1}.

Because at each step, best responses are unique and at k = n the firm has only one best
response when every firm k < n is best responding to xn and to each other, there is a
unique Herculean equilibrium within the herculean class.
No non-herculean equilibria exists: By contradiction. Suppose x represents a nonherculean equilibrium. Order firms from smallest cutoff x1 to largest, xn . Let p be
the first instance (smallest cutoff) that a strength reversal occurs. That is, xp < xp+1
but sp > sp+1 . Because every firm k ∈ {1, . . . , p} is ordered by strength, they satisfy conditions (A.12), (A.10), and (A.11). We show that xp+1 cannot lie above xp
(i.e, a contradiction). Fix x and let x̂ be the value that satisfies bp (x̂, x−p,p+1 ) = x̂,
where bp (x−p ) is firm’s p best response to x−p . This best response exists (and is
unique) by Lemma B.2. The value x̂ exists because bp (x−p ) is continuously decreasing in xp+1 . In addition, following analogous steps to those in Claim 11, we can show
f
(xp+1 ) Fp (xp ) 1
that dbp (x−p )/dxp+1 > − Fp+1
. Then, by Lemma B.3, Πp (x̂, x̂, x−p,p+1 ) =
p+1 (xp+1 ) fp (xp ) n−1
0 < Πp+1 (x̂, x̂, x−p,p+1 ). Also, letting x̂ = (bp (x−p ), x−p ) observe that
dΠp+1 (x̂)
dbp (x−p ) ∂Πp+1 (x̂)
fp+1 (xp+1 ) ∆p+1,p (x̂)
= Π0p+1 (x̂) +
> Π0p+1 (x̂) −
>0
dxp+1
dxp+1
∂xp
Fp+1 (xp+1 ) n − 1
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Thus, Πp+1 (x̂) is strictly increasing in xp+1 which implies that Πp+1 (x̂) > 0 for every
xp+1 ≥ x̂, which implies that no xp+1 > bp (x−p ) = xp exists.


B

Auxiliary Results

Lemma B.1. Πi (x) is strictly increasing in every dimension of x.
Proof of Lemma B.1. Start with the derivative of Πi with respect to i, then



Z ∞


X
Y

dΠi

≡ Π0i (x) =
Fj (xj )
πi0 xi , ve\i φ(ve\i )dne −1 ve\i > 0, (B.1)


dxi
{xj }j∈I (e)
e∈Ei

j∈Oi (e)

i

which is positive as, by assumption A4, there is a positive probability that firm i is the
sole entrant. For the derivative of Πi with respect to xj , pick a market structure e such
that j ∈ Oi (e). Conditional on e, the derivative of Πi with respect to xj is equal to


Z ∞
Y

πi xi , ve\i φ(ve\i )dne −1 ve\i .
fj (xj ) 
Fk (xk )
{xk }k∈Ii (e)

k∈Oi (e)\j

Now take market structure e from above and, using Leibnitz differentiation, compute
the derivative of Πi with respect to xj conditional on market structure e ∪ j; i.e., entry
decisions by every firm remain the same as in e except that of firm j, which now enters


Z ∞
Y

−fj (xj ) 
Fk (xk )
πi xi , xj , ve\i φ(ve\i )dne −1 ve\i ,
k∈Oi (e)\j

{xk }k∈Ii (e)

where we used Oi (e)\j = Oi (e∪j) and Ii (e) = Ii (e∪j)\j. Observe that both expressions
from above only differ in sign and in the profit function that is integrated over. Summing
both equations delivers an expression where the integral is over δi,j (xi , xj , ve\i ) ≥ 0, which
is defined in equation (3). Summing across every market structure we obtain



Z ∞


X
Y

fj (xj )
dΠi

=
Fk (xk )
δi,j xi , xj , ve\i φ(ve\i )dne −1 ve\i .


dxj
Fj (xj )
(xk )k∈I (e)
e∈Ei \Ej

=

k∈Oi (e)

i

fj (xj )
∆i,j (x) > 0
Fj (xj )

(B.2)

Thus, the derivative is positive.



Lemma B.2. Let Πi be defined by (1). Let A and B be disjoint sets of k and r firms, such
that i ∈ A. Define f : [a, b]k+r → [a, b]n−k−r to be any continuous function and let xB
be any vector of cutoff strategies for firm in B. Then, there exist a value x̂ such that the
symmetric k-dimensional vector x̂A = (x̂)i∈A satisfies Πi (x̂A , f (x̂A , xB ), xB ) = 0. When
the function f is constant—i.e., when x−A = (f (x̂A , xB ), xB ) is equal to an exogenously
given vector—the value of x̂ is unique.
Proof. Fix xB , because f is continuous, the function Πi (xA , f (xA , xB ), xB ) is continuous in the input value x of the symmetric vector xA . Let v A = (v i )i∈A and
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v A = (v i )i∈A . Observe that assumptions A4 A2 jointly imply Πi (v A , f (v A , xB ), xB ) ≤
πi (v i ) < 0. Similarly, assumption A4 and Lemma B.1 imply, Πi (v A , f (v A , xB ), xB ) ≥
Πi (v i , a−i ) > 0. Then, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exist x̂ ∈ (v i , v̄i ) such
that Πi (x̂AP
, f (x̂A , xB ), xB ) = 0. For uniqueness when f is constant, by the chain rule,
dΠi /dxi = k∈A ∂Πi /∂xk > 0 where the inequality follows from Lemma B.1. Therefore
Πi (xA , f (xA , xB ), xB ), as a function of the value x for the symmetric vector xA , crosses
zero once.

Lemma B.3. Suppose firms are quasi-symmetric. Order them by strength, then for any
firm i < j and vector of strategies for the other firms x−i,j , we have
Πi (y, y, x−i,j ) > Πj (y, y, x−i,j ).
Proof. If firms Q
are quasi-symmetric in profit, theQinequality follows from definition.
Recall φ(ve ) = j∈I(e) fj (vj ) and let φ−k (ve ) = j∈I(e)\k fj (vj ). For games quasisymmetric in distribution, observe



Z b

X 
Y

Fj (y)
Πi (y, y, x−i,j ) =
Fk (xk )
πi xi , ve\i φ(ve\i )dne −1 ve\i +


(xk )k∈Ii (e)
e∈Ei \Ej
k∈Oi (e)\j



Z bZ b

X 
Y

ne −1


Fk (xk )
πi xi , ve\i φ−k (ve\i )fj (v)d
ve\i


y
(xk )k∈Ii (e)\j
e∈Ei ∩Ej
k∈Oi (e)



Z b

X 
Y

Fi (y)
>
Fk (xk )
πi xi , ve\i φ(ve\i )dne −1 ve\i +


(xk )k∈Ii (e)
e∈Ei \Ej
k∈Oi (e)\j



Z bZ b

X 
Y


Fk (xk )
πi xi , ve\i φ−k (ve\i )fi (v)dne −1 ve\i


y
(xk )k∈I (e)\j
e∈Ei ∩Ej

k∈Oi (e)

i

= Πj (y, y, x−i,j )
where the inequality uses two properties of FOSD. The first term uses that Fi (x) ≤ Fj (x)
Rb
Rb
for all x. The second term uses that y h(x)fi (x)dx ≤ y h(x)fj (x)dx for any nonincreasing function h(x).

Lemma B.4. Let firm k be stronger than firm k. Suppose the firms play cutoffs xk < xj ;
then, for any firm i, ∆i,j (x) ≥ ∆i,k (x) if: (i) The firms are quasi-symmetric in profits or
(ii) The firms are quasi-symmetric in distribution and satisfy the profit loss only depends
on the number of entrants.
Proof. Start by observing that, in the expression for ∆i,j (x) (see equation (3)), the sum
over market structures can be divided into two disjoints sets: e ∈ Ei \ (Ej ∩ Ek ) and
e ∈ (Ei ∩ Ek ) \ Ej . Using these sets subtract ∆i,j (x) − ∆i,k (x) to obtain



Z ∞


X
Y


F` (x` )
δi (xi , xj , ve\i ) − δi (xi , xk , ve\i ) φ(ve\i )dne −1 ve\i


(x` )`∈I (e)
e∈Ei \(Ej ∩Ek )

`∈Oi (e)

i
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Z ∞Z ∞


Y
Fj (xj )
δi (xi , xj , ve\i )φ−k (ve\i )fk (vk )dne −1 ve\i
F` (x` )
+


(x` )`∈Ii (e)\k
xk
`∈Oi (e)\j
e∈(Ei ∩Ek )\Ej



Z ∞Z ∞


Y
X


F` (x` )
δi (xi , xk , ve\i )φ−j (ve\i )fj (vj )dne −1 ve\i
Fk (xk )
−


xj
(x` )`∈I (e)\j
X

e∈(Ei ∩Ej )\Ek

`∈Oi (e)\k

i

(B.3)
where, by profits
Qbeing anonymous, we dropped the second sub index from δi (xi , xj , ve\i )
and φ−k (ve ) = j∈I(e)\k fj (vj ). Observe that the first term is non-negative as
δi (xi , xj , ve\i ) − δi (xi , xk , ve\i ) = πi (xi , xk , ve\i ) − πi (xi , xj , ve\i ) ≥ 0
where the last inequality follow from assumption A2 and xk < xj . We now show that
the subtraction of the second and third terms in equation (B.3) is non-negative. Observe
that for each market structure e ∈ (Ei ∩ Ek ) \ Ej , firm k participates but firm j does
not. We construct a lower bound for the second term in equation (B.3) by reversing the
participation roles of k and j in e. We then show that the lower bound is equal to the
third term. Thus, the subtraction is non-negative.
When the game is quasi-symmetric in profit, we can drop the sub-index from the
distributions of type. Bounding the second term



Z ∞Z ∞


Y
X
F (xj )
F (x` )
δi (xi , xj , ve\i )φ−k (ve\i )f (vk )dne −1 ve\i


xk
(x` )`∈Ii (e)\k
`∈Oi (e)\j
e∈(Ei ∩Ek )\Ej



Z ∞Z ∞


X
Y
F (xk )
>
δi (xi , xk , ve\i )φ−k (ve\i )f (vk )dne −1 ve\i
F (x` )


(x` )`∈Ii (e)\k
xj
e∈(Ei ∩Ek )\Ej
`∈Oi (e)\j



Z ∞Z ∞


X
Y


=
F (xk )
δi (xi , xk , ve\i )φ−k (ve\i )f (vk )dne −1 ve\i
F (x` )


(x` )`∈I (e)\j
xj
e∈(Ei ∩Ej )\Ek

`∈Oi (e)\k

i

where in the inequality we used xj > xk in the probability of firm j being out of the
market and in the domain of the integration over k’s types, δi (xi , xj , ve\i ) ≥ 0 (so that
integrating over a smaller domain decreases the value of the integral) and δi (xi , s, ve\i )
being increasing in s (by assumption A2). The equality follows by re-arranging indexes,
noticing that we simply inverted the roles of firm k and j; i.e., the lower bound above is
identical to the third term in equation (B.3), proving the result.
When the game is quasi-symmetric in distribution and the profit loss only depends
on the number of entrants, the second term becomes






X
Y
Y
Fj (xj )
F` (x` ) (1 − Fk (xk )) (1 − F` (x` )) δi (xi , ne )


e∈(Ei ∩Ek )\Ej
`∈Oi (e)\j
`∈Ii (e)\k






X
Y
Y
Fk (xk )
>
F` (x` ) (1 − Fj (xj )) (1 − F` (x` )) δi (xi , ne )


e∈(Ei ∩Ek )\Ej

`∈Oi (e)\j

`∈Ii (e)\k
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where the first inequality uses stochastic dominance and the fact that xk < xj (so that
Fj (xj ) ≥ Fj (xk ) ≥ Fk (xk )). The equality follows by re-arranging indexes, noticing that
the lower bound above is identical to the third term in equation (B.3), proving the
result.
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